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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH
HALLOWAY,

No. 20519
A person under eighteen
years of age.
Navajo Nation, Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioners filed their Petition for Adoption on May 23,
1980. (R. 2-4).
January

Numerous hearings were held in the matter.

28, 1985, the Honorable

Judge

David

Sam

entered

decision in the matter granting the Petition for Adoption.
575-584).

On
his
(R.

The final Decree of Adoption was signed and entered

by Judge David Sam on February 4, 1985.

(R. 585-586).

It is

from the decision and entry of the Decree of Adoption that the
appellant appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reference is made throughout this brief to the transcript of
the consent of the natural mother taken on May 30, 1980, (hereinafter "Tr. I"), the transcript of the hearing of April 7, 1983,
(hereinafter

"Tr. II"), and the transcript

of the hearing of

October 22 and 23, 1984, (hereinafter "Tr. III").
1.

Michael Carter (his Indian name was Jeremiah Halloway)

was born on May 14, 1977, to Cecelia Saunders.

(Tr. II, p. 18).
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The child was born out of wedlock.

The natural mother testified

that the father of Michael Carter was Ernest Yazzie, Jr. (Tr. II,
p. 18, lines. 7-9).
2.

The natural mother testified that the initial care of

the child was given by her mother, Bessie Begay, (Tr. II, p. 19,
lines 4-8).

The natural mother did testify that she had access

to the child up to the time he was six months of age. (Tr. II, p.
19, lines 11-14).

Cecelia Saunders testified that during the

initial six months, she lived with her mother, Bessie Begay and
her step-father, Jack Begay.
line 5 ) .

(Tr. II, p. 19, lines 15 to p. 20,

After the six month period, Cecelia started seeing

Arthur Saunders and did not live with her mother and stayed
either at Arthur's house or at her house. (Tr. I, p. 20, lines
2-14).
3.

Cecelia

Saunders

testified

that

she

married

Saunders in July of 1978, but could not remember the date.
II, p. 20, lines 18-19).

Arthur
(Tr.

Cecelia testified that the primary care

of Michael Carter, after the initial six month period, was given
by her mother, Bessie Begay.

(Tr. II, p. 20, lines 20-23).

Additionally, Cecelia testified that Bessie Begay and Jack Begay
had a serious drinking problem.

(Tr. II, p. 20, line 24 through

p. 21, line 2) .

2
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4.

Cecelia told a Navajo social worker in a home visit on

July 23, 1982, that she gave her son, Michael Carter, to her
mother to be cared for in order to save her marriage with Arthur
Saunders.

In that same visit, Cecelia also stated that she did

not provide any monetary or other type of support to Jeremiah and
that

her

husband,

Jeremiah very much.

Arthur

Saunders,

the

step-father,

disliked

Cecelia testified at trial that Arthur did

not like the child because he was not his son. Cecelia further
testified that the step-father stated that he was not going to
bother with the child and would not care for or support Michael
Carter and would not give the child the normal love that a father
would give a child.

(Tr. II, p. 20, lines 3-20; p. 22, line 23

through p. 23, line 9).
Cecelia

testified

that

there were times when the

social

workers found the child left unattended because Bessie Begay was
drunk.

(Tr. II, p. 23, lines 21-25).

Cecelia testified that

when Bessie would drink she would go on an alcoholic binge for a
week.

(Tr. II, p. 23, lines 7-9).

The natural mother testified

that Jack Begay, her step-father, had the same drinking problem
and accordingly never assumed any care of the child.

(Tr. II,

p. 24, lines 10-15).
5.

The only contact the natural mother had with Michael

Carter from the time Michael was six months of age is when the
3
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child would be brought over for approximately two to three days
at Arthur's house every two to three weeks.
lines 4-8; p. 26, lines 22-25).

(Tr. II, p. 25,

In fact, two of Cecelia's six

sisters, Rosita and Polly complained of the care that Jeremiah
was receiving.
6.

(Tr. II, p. 28, lines 2-6; p. 20, lines 14-19).

Polly Ann Dick, the natural mother's sister, reported to

Cecelia that she had found the child with Jack Begay who was
drunk and that Jeremiah had not eaten.

Polly was unsure of the

number of days that Jeremiah had been without food.
30,

lines 13-14).

(Tr. II, p.

Polly did testify that Michael Carter had

been passed to different people since the time he had been born.
(Tr. II, p. 57, lines 19-20).

Polly further testified that when

she picked Michael up, the child was only wearing a T-shirt and
underwear. (Tr. II, p. 59, lines 8-17).
? • C e c e l i a , the natural mother, testified that she did not
object to the child being taken to Utah

(Tr. II, p. 31, lines

19-20) and further that she had talked with Polly about giving
the child up for adoption and did not object to it.

(Tr. II, p.

32, lines 13-16).
Cecelia Saunders came to Utah on May 30, 1980, and appeared
before the Honorable Judge David Sam.

During those proceedings

wherein her consent to adoption was taken, she was interrogated
by Mr. Maxfield.

In the course of that examination, she was
4
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asked whether or not it was her desire to have the child adopted
by the petitioners, Dan and Pat Carter, and she indicated that it
was.

(Tr. I, p. 3, lines 14-16),

Cecelia further testified

that she understood that she could not change her mind and did
not

have

any

intention

of

approving of the adoption.
indicated

that

she had

changing

her mind

with

regard

(Tr. I, p. 3, lines, 17-23).

not

been

paid

any money

to

Cecelia

except

that

necessary to travel to Utah and that she did not expect to receive
any money after the proceeding was over.

Cecelia finally testi-

fied that there had not been any other promises or inducements for
her consent to the adoption.

(Tr. I, p. 3, line 24 through p. 4,

line 18).
8.
child

was

Cecelia

Saunders

testified

taken

to Utah

for

that two years after the

adoption,

she was

contacted by

representatives of the Tribe who indicated to her that Jeremiah
could not be adopted out of the State. (Tr. II, p. 35, lines 3-4).
Cecelia was asked by the Tribal members if she really wanted to
give Jeremiah up for adoption and she answered that question by
saying "yes."

(Tr. II, p. 35, lines 6-11).

In that regard,

Cecelia Saunders was asked if there were any of her family members
who could adopt the child and she indicated that there was only
one sister who would take the child and that was Mini, and she had

5
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been determined by the Tribe, itself, not to be fit.

(Tr. II, p.

45, line 20 through p. 46, line 2).
9.

Michael Carter has been in the home of the petitioners,

Dan and Pat Carter, since March 23, 1980.

(Tr. II, p. 78).

SUMMARY OF TRIBAL RECORDS
After Michael Carter was born, social agencies within the
Navajo nation became involved in monitoring the care that Michael
Carter was receiving.

Some of the Tribal records were marked as

an Exhibit at the time of trial and the information provided
therein is enlightening and helpful in the resolution of the legal
issues raised by the appellants.
1.

(R. 120-191).

In a home visit on January 23, 1982, Cecelia Saunders,

the natural mother of Jeremiah, admitted that she gave her son
away to Bessie Begay in order to save her marriage with Arthur
Saunders.
2.

In a report of January 23, 1980, a referral was made

to the Tribe social agencies indicating that Jeremiah was being
neglected by his mother, Cecelia Saunders.

The child was reported

to be constantly on the go with both grandparents on their sheep
herding job, that Bessie had a drinking problem and there were
fifteen members living in the same household.
3.
mother

In a home visit in March 19, 1980, Bessie Begay, the
of

Cecelia

Saunders,

indicated

6

that
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Jeremiah

(Michael

Carter) had been with them since birth, contrary to the natural
mother's testimony at trial that the care of the minor child had
been given to the grandmother at six months.
4.

On April 30, 1980, the social worker was informed that

Jeremiah (Michael Carter) was taken from Bessie's home by Polly
Dick.

During that visit, Cecelia, the natural mother, stated

that she had given her consent to Polly, her sister, to go ahead
and place Jeremiah

(Michael) in a foster home

in Utah.

Her

reason for making this decision was due to Bessie Begay's drinking
problem.

Another

fact warranting Cecelia's decision was that

Cecelia herself, could not keep Jeremiah (Michael) in her custody
because the child was neglected and abused by her husband, Arthur
Saunders.
5*
the

The case worker's note for May 2, 1980, indicates that

grandmother,

Bessie

Begay,

continued

to

abuse

alcohol.

Shortly thereafter, a case worker indicated that all of the family
relatives of Jeremiah were unstable except for the Tolths.
social

worker's

report

of

December

8,

1980,

indicates

The
that

Jeremiah was residing with Dan and Pat Carter in Spanish Fork,
Utah, and that Cecelia Saunders had put him up for adoption.

In

the assessment portion of that note, it is indicated that Cecelia
still wanted to continue with giving up the child in order to
save her marriage with Mr. Saunders.
7
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6.

On December 1, 1980, a home visit was made to Cecelia's

sister, Kathy Bilgarito.

In that home visit, it was learned that

Kathy had done the same thing Cecelia is doing.

Kathy had given

up three of her children to save her marriage with Ralph.
In the ICWA (Indian Child Welfare Act) case update report,
dated January 20, 1980, it was indicated that Cecelia and her
family were residing with her mother-in-law.

The note indicated

that Arthur Saunders, the step-father, could not accept Jeremiah
as

his

step-child.

The

report

indicates

that

Cecelia

gave

consent to place the child in Utah for several reasons.

The

first reason was that Bessie Begay unable to take care of the
child because of the heavy abuse of alcohol.
was

that

giving

up

the

child

was

marriage with Arthur Saunders.

The second reason

necessary

to maintain

her

The note explicitly states that

Cecelia reported that Arthur disliked the child very much, that
he often abused and neglected the child, and that Cecelia could
not tolerate seeing her child hurt.

The report concludes that

Cecelia Saunders was from a big family, that she had several
sisters but all were unstable and did not have a house of their
own.

In fact, the report noted that the sisters had done the

same thing in giving up their children to save their marriages.
7.

The

ICWA

narrative,

March

8

23,

1981,
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indicates

that

Cecelia

still had her mind

set on letting

the Carters adopt

Jeremiah.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL FACTS
1.

The Petition for Adoption was filed on behalf of the

Carters on May 29, 1980.
2.

(R. 2-4).

The consent of the natural mother was signed in open

court on May 30, 1980.
3.

(Tr. I, pp. 1-5; R. 6, 7).

On May 11, 1982, the Navajo Nation filed a Motion to

Dismiss and Transfer Jurisdiction and at the same time, filed an
Affidavit and Revocation of Consent to Adoption signed by the
mother, Cecelia Ann Dick.

(R. 12-15).

After the briefs were

filed, the court heard oral arguments and rendered its ruling on
July 14, 1982.

The Ruling is set out in the Appendix as Exhibit

"A."

The court found the domicile of the minor child to be with

that

of

the petitioners,

the

Carters.

The

court

made that

finding based upon the fact that the child's residence appeared
to

be

voluntarily

mother, grandmother,

and

purposefully

removed

from

the

natural

and reservation to the petitioners.

The

court found that in light of the long period of time the child
had been with the petitioners that there was "good cause" for the
District

Court

to

take

jurisdiction

to

hear

the

matter

and

further found that the requirements of the ICWA had, to that
stage, been satisfied.

In its ruling of July
9
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14, 1982, the

court explicitly allowed both parties to put on evidence as it
related to the issue of domicile which hearing would be set upon
the application of either party.
4.

The hearing on domicile was held on April 7, 1983.

At

that time, all parties were present and presented testimony and
introduced evidence.

After the hearing, an Order was entered

which Order was dated October 6, 1983.

A copy of that Order is

attached in the Appendix as Exhibit MB."

In the Order, the court

explicitly found that the child had been taken from the reservation by a family member with some of the family's consent and
delivered to the petitioners for adoption.

The court found that

no one in the family protested the placement of the child with the
petitioners.

The court found that the relocation of the child

with the petitioners was done with the intent to transfer to the
petitioners full parental rights as it related to the child and
with the further intent to abandon all parental rights in the
child.
5.
been

(R. 182-184).
After extensive discovery and pre-trial memoranda had

filed with the court, the court

conducted

a hearing on

October 22, 1984, relative to whether or not the parental rights
of the natural mother should be terminated in the child, Michael
Carter.

The court rendered its decision in the matter on January

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28, 1985.
H ,f

C

A copy of the decision is attached hereto as Exhibit

in the Appendix.
6.

The

(R. 575-584).

Decree

February 4, 1985.

of Adoption

was

signed

by Judge

Sam on

In the court's decision, it was noted that

testimony had been received from numerous experts, including Paul
Steven Buckingham,

Dr. Robert Crist, Dr. Samuel Roll, and Dr.

Robert J. Howell.

Based upon the testimony, the court found

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the separation of the petitioners
and the young child would result in serious emotional damage to
the child.

The court, in the same ruling, also found that there

was serious questions as to the fitness of any of the natural
family members to take the child.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Judge David Sam properly took jurisdiction of the petition
for adoption under the U.S. Constitution and the ICWA.

The lower

court found all of the pre-requisites required by the ICWA before
the parental rights of the natural mother were terminated.

The

lower court had no obligation to provide the Order of the Navajo
Nation with Full Faith and Credit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO RECEIVE THE CONSENT TO ADOPTION
EXECUTED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER.
11
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The
Cecelia

appellants
Saunders,

contend

at

the

in

Point

time

her

I

of

consent

their
for

brief

that

adoption

was

executed on May 30, 1980, was not advised as to the content of
the ICWA.

That assertion

is totally

inaccurate. The natural

mother, Cecelia Saunders, has misrepresented the facts to almost
every party concerned in the case,

Cecelia Saunders informed the

Tribe for a long period of time that the child was only be to
placed for foster care and was very disgruntled when the Tribe
found out that she had given up the child for adoption.
at trial was contradictory.
hearing

on April

Testimony

It was Judge Sam, who after the

7, 1983, explicitly

found

that

the

natural

mother was advised at the time of her consent as to the ICWA.
The court found that the natural mother consented to the placement
and did abandon the child.

(R. 94).

The ICWA explicitly indicates that state courts have jurisdiction

over

a

child

custody

proceeding

termination of parental rights is sought.

or a

case

in which

25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)

provides in pertinent part as follows:
In any state court proceeding for the foster
care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or
residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe, the court, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, shall transfer
such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the
tribe, absent objection of either parent,
upon the petition of either parent, or the
Indian custodian, or the Indian child's
12
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tribe: provided, that such transfer shall be
subject to declination by the tribal court of
such tribe.
In the court's ruling of July 14, 1982, the court explicitly
found that based upon the voluntary change of residence of the
minor child by the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation,
the domicile of the minor child was with the petitioners.

The

court further found in view of that fact and the long period of
time the child had been with the petitioners, that there was
"good cause" for the court to take jurisdiction of the case.
The argument advanced by the Navajo Tribe is deceptive and
has been made throughout the proceedings.
divided into two subparts, (a) and (b).

25 U.S.C § 1911 is
Subsection

(a) states

that the Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction when the child
resides

or

subsection
domiciled

is

domiciled

(b), clearly

not

provides

or residing within

court has jurisdiction.
was

within

domiciled

or

the

reservation.

that when

the

the reservation,

However,

child

is not

that the state

Based upon the finding that the child
residing

within

the

reservation,

Judge

Sam made his finding that the state court had jurisdiction to
hear the matter.
A review of the legislative history of the ICWA leads to the
clear conclusion that the Act contemplates adjudication of Indian
adoptive matters by state courts, and that such court adjudication
13
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comports fully with the purposes of the Act.
H.R.

The house report on

12533, which became the ICWA of 1978, stressed that the

purpose

of the bill was to provide

"minimal

safeguards with

respect to state proceedings for Indian child custody," and to
"impose certain procedural burdens upon state courts in order to
protect the substantive rights of Indian children, Indian parents,
and Indian tribes in state court proceedings for child custody."
1978 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, pp. 7540-41
(emphasis

added).

Department
intruded

of

In

Justice

response
that

the

to

concerns

bill

into areas of traditional

may

state

raised

have

by

the

impermissibly

interest, the House

reports:
. . . the provisions of the Bill do not oust
the state from the exercise of its legitimate
police
powers
in
regulating
domestic
relations. . . .
f

The

While the committee does not feel that it
is necessary or desireable to oust the States
of
their
traditional
jurisdiction
over
Indian
children
falling
within
their
geographic limits, it does feel the need to
establish
minimum
federal
standards
and
procedural safeguards in the State Indian
child proceedings. . . . Id.
report

also

emphasized

the

"duty

of

state

courts,

otherwise having jurisdiction over the subject matter, to enforce
federal substantive rights," Id., at 7541; see also, 7535.

14
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During

House

debate

on

the

act,

Representative

Udall,

who sponsored the Bill, also indicated that the Act "establishes
minimum

federal standards and procedural safeguards to protect

Indian families when faced with child custody proceedings against
them in state agencies or courts."

Congressional Record, Vol.

124, part 28, p. 38102. In response to concerns raised by the
Justice

Department

regarding

the

apparent

intrusion

into

the

state's authority to adjudicate domestic matters, Representative
Udall continued:
. . . where an Indian child is residing or
domiciled off an Indian reservation, the
State has full jurisdiction over the child
in a custody proceeding, including the power
to remove the child from the parents on an
emergency basis to protect to the child. Id.,
at 38107, (emphasis added). See also, 38107;
Congressional Record, Vol. 123, part 29 p.
37226 Senate Debated.
POINT II
THE MINOR CHILD, MICHAEL CARTER,
WAS DOMICILED WITH THE PETITIONERS
IN UTAH.
There can be no question that the general rule is that a
child born out of wedlock takes the domicile of the mother with
whom it lives.

Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d

773, 775 (1958); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 22,
Comment C (1971).
understood

that

In analyzing the issue of domicile, it must be
the

ICWA

does not

dictate

the definition of
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"domicile,"

but

leaves

that

issue

for

the

state

determine based upon the law of the jurisdiction.
the guidelines

published

by the Department

courts

to

According to

of the

Interior's

Bureau of Indian Affairs, many commentators recommend that the
Act include a uniform definition of residence and domicile.
recommendation, however, was rejected.

That

The guidelines to the

ICWA state as follows:
Such definitions were not included because
these terms are well defined under existing
state law. There is no indication that these
state law definitions tend to undermine, in
any way, the purposes of the Act. Recommending
special definitions for the purposes of this
Act alone would simply provide unnecessary
complications in the law.
44 Fed. Reg. 67583, 67585 (1979).
The problem with the law cited by the appellant is that the
trial court was not dealing with a case in which the domicile of
an illegitimate child was to be considered.

The trial court was

dealing with a case in which the mother in March of 1980, allowed
her child to be taken from the reservation and placed with the
petitioners for adoption.

After relinquishing physical custody

of the child in March of 1980, with the intent to deprive herself
permanently thereof, she traveled to Utah on May 30, 1980, and
gave her written voluntary consent to the adoption.

It was not

until April 30, 1982, that the natural mother signed an Affidavit
and Revocation of the Consent to Adoption.

(R. 15). Thus, for a
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period exceeding two years, it was the intent of the natural
mother to give the young child up for adoption.
When, as in the present case, the child has been abandoned
by both parents, the Restatement says that if "no guardian of the
child's person is appointed, the child shall acquire the domicile
at the home of a grandparent or other person who stands in loco
parentis to him and with whom he lives."

Restatement (Second) of

Conflict of Law, § 22, Comment i (1969) (emphasis added).
Comment continues:

The

"The child should therefore have a domicile

at the home of the person who stands in loco parentis to him and
with

whom

he

lives

even

though

this

person

is

not

a blood

relative."
The decisions of this State are in accord.
case, the Court held

that the appellant,

In one such

though not a blood

relative, appeared to have assumed the status of a person in loco
parentis.

The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing

to determine whether the appellant was in loco parentis.
v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).

The Court stated:

The term "in loco parentis" means in the
place of a parent, and a "person in loco
parentis" is one who has assumed the status
and obligations of a parent without formal
adoption.
Whether or not one assumes this
status depends on whether that person intends
to assume that obligation.

17
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Gribble

Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66 (emphasis in the original).

Although the

Carters did not formally adopt Jeremiah from March of 1980 to the
time the consent of the natural mother was revoked in April of
1982, there was no question that all of the parties assumed in
March of 1980, that the Carters would stand in the position of
"loco parentis" to the child.

It was for that purpose that the

child was transported to Utah.

It was the clear understanding of

all parties in the case.

The trial court granted the Carters

temporary custody of the minor child on July 14, 1982. (R. 35).
The Restatement, suggests a second way by which Jeremiah's
domicile may

have

shifted

off

the

reservation.

Comment "f"

of § 22 states that an "emancipated child may acquire a domicile
of choice, irrespective of his parent's domicile."

With regard to

how a child who has yet to reach his majority becomes emancipated,
the Comment states:
[T]he majority [of
more than that the
years of discretion,
of life, either with
because they are dead

states] insist upon no
minor, having obtained
maintain a separate way
his parent's consent or
or have abandoned him.

In Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977), the Court
held that to find abandonment, it is not necessary to show that
the parent has affirmatively abandoned, but rather, in most cases
it can be better determined from the parents' actions than from
the words.
18
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In Wilson v. Peirce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 383

P.2d 925 (1963),

the Court held that where parents exhibit an intent to completely
and

permanently

abandon

a child,

it matters

not whether

the

parent has left the child with others who may be expected to care
for the child or whether it is left to mere chance of whatever
fate might follow it.
Similarly, in Robertson v. Hutchinson. 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah
1977), the Court found that the natural parent had abandoned the
child so as to permit adoption of the child without consent of
natural

parent

evidence

that

where
the

it was
natural

shown

upon

parent

had

clear

and

either

expressed

intention,

or so conducted himself as to clearly

intention,

to relinquish

parental

responsibilities to the child.

control

and

convincing
an

indicate an

reject

parental

Completely in line with the case

law applicable to the matter, Judge Sam in his ruling of July 14,
1982, Exhibit "A" hereto, (R. 35), found that the domicile of the
minor child was that of the petitioners and based that finding
upon the

fact that the child's residence was voluntarily and

purposefully removed from the mother, grandmother and reservation
to the petitioners.
One of the key cases discussing the issue In the Matter of
Dureya, 115 Arizona

86, 563 P.2d

885

(1977).

In that case,

three petitions for termination of the parent-child relationship
19
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were filed and concerned three American Indian children who were
enrolled

with

the White Mountain

Apache

Tribe.

The

parents of the children were White Mountain Apaches

natural
and they

moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the State Juvenile
Court had no subject matter jurisdiction.

The juvenile court did

dismiss the petitions and entered an order which found that the
Tribe had at least concurrent

if not sole jurisdiction.

The

petitioners appealed.
The Supreme Court, on appeal, found that one of the Indian
children was placed by his unwed mother with the petitioners
when he was six weeks old.

The Court found that his mother who

wished to return to school, brought him off the reservation to
Lakeside, Arizona, where petitioners lived.

At the time of the

hearing the child was four and a half years old and had lived
continuously with the petitioners since May of 1972, and had seen
his natural mother only once during that time.
Another one of the children was placed with the petitioners
in September of 1969, by an elderly missionary woman.
The third child was placed with petitioners by a worker from
a social agency in Arizona where both of her parents were jailed
there.

A few months after the natural parents were released,

they visited the child in Lakeside and at one time, took the
child back with them for a short while, but returned the child to
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petitioners in January of 1981.

That child had resided with the

petitioners for approximately six years.
All

three

petitioners
explicitly

children

to Tucson,
that

the

had

Arizona.

State

subsequently
The

of Arizona

moved

court
had

on

with

appeal

a very

the

stated

substantial

interest in all of the children and found that the juvenile court
erred in failing to take jurisdiction in the proceeding.

Matter

of Dureya, supra., at 887.
Another

important

case

on

the

issue

is

Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179 (1972).

that

of

In Re

In that case, the

order of the district court in awarding the custody and care of
a child on the basis of abandonment was affirmed by the supreme
court.

The court found that the natural father at the time the

order was made was charged in justice court for willful neglect
and that the child was abandoned and helpless in Valley County,
not on the Indian reservation.
been

abusive,

and

that

The court found the father had

the mother

had

the

child

taken

her by order of the Tribal Court for parental neglect.
concluded that the child had been abandoned.

The court

The court explicitly

stated:
However, the "fact11 of neglect, that of
abandonment of a helpless infant, occurred
off the reservation and continued for over a
year off the reservation. The mother's only
effort, to all practical purposes, was to
remain in the sanctuary of the reservation
21
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oblivious to the needs of her child.
This
fact alone removes the case from the heretofore cited Indian jurisdiction case.
In Re Cantrell, at 182.
Many cases, while acknowledging a minor has the same domicile
as the parent with whom the child lives, have stated that the
domicile of the child who is the ward of the court is domiciled
at the location of the court.
58, 473 P.2d 403 (1970).

Betts v. Betts, 3 Wash. App. 53,

Accord, Restatement (Second) of Conflict

of Law, § 22 (1971).
Another similar case is

In the Adoption of John Doe, 89 New

Mexico 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976).

In that case, the mother of a

child, Navajo, placed the child voluntarily with the adoption
agency.
the

The petitioners were non-Indians and were challenged by

child's

father,

grandfather,

and

as

amicus

association on American Indian Affairs, Inc.

curiae,

That Association

challenged the jurisdiction of the New Mexico Court.
replied:
The Association claims that the Navajo Nation
has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
permanent custody of its minor members.
Decisions concerning such a jurisdictional
claim are based on cases where the child was
a resident of or domiciled on an Indian
reservation.
Fisher v. District Court, 424
U.S.
382, 96 Sup. Ct. 943; Wisconsin
Potowatomies, etc. v. Houston, 393 F.Supp.
719 (BC Mich. 1973); Wakefield v. Littlewhite,
276 Maryland 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
The
record does not show that a child either
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the

The Court

resided or was domiciled on the Navajo
reservation . . . whatever concurrent jurisdiction the courts of the Navajo Nation might
have, New Mexico has an interest in the
welfare of a child who was in New Mexico and
not within the boundary of the reservation,
[citations omitted].
Adoption of Doe, at 916-917.

See also, DeCoteau v. District

County Court for the Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 95
Sup.

Ct.

1082

(1975),

reh.

denied,

421

U.S.

939

(1975);

Application In the Matter of Montoya, 85 N.M 356, 512 P.2d 384,
(1973); Uppen v. Superior Court, 116 Ariz. 81 567, P.2d 12 (1977).
Although

the

cases

cited

above

were

decided

before

the

passage of ICWA, all that were decided on the basis of whether or
not the Indian children were domiciled on the reservation.

The

state court's determination of domicile would be the same whether
or not the ICWA had been enacted.
One final matter should be noted.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-48

(1975 as amended) states in pertinent part as follows:
The court may decree an involuntary termination of all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the Court finds either
(a), (b), or (c) as follows . . .
(b)
that the parent or parents have
abandoned the child. It shall be prima facia
evidence of abandonment that the parent or
parents, although having legal custody of the
child, have surrendered physical custody of
the child and for a period of six months
following such surrender, have not manifested
to the child or the person having the physical
custody of the child, the firm intention to
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resume
physical
custody
or
to
make
arrangements for the care of the child; . . .
In this case, the court explicitly found that the natural mother
and family had abandoned the child as stated in paragraph 4 of
the court's ruling of October 6, 1983, as attached in the Appendix
as Exhibit "B."

Having made that determination, the sections of

the Restatement are applicable in allowing the finding that the
petitioners stand in loco parentis to the child which finding was
made by the trial court in its ruling awarding temporary custody
of the minor child with the petitioners on July 14, 1982.
The

leading

termination

definition

of parental

of

rights

abandonment
is the

for

following

purposes
from

Children v. Welffenstein, 560 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1977):
Whether or not there has been abandonment
within the meaning of the statute is to be
determined objectively taken into account not
only the verbal expressions of the natural
parents but their conduct as parents as well
Abandonment consists of conduct on
the part of a parent which implies
a
conscious
disregard
of
the
obligations owed by a parent to the
child leading to the destruction of
the parent-child relationship.
Abandonment may also be proved in a subjective
term, as where, the "parent has either
expressed and intentioned, or so conducted
himself as to clearly indicate an intention
to relinquish parental rights and reject
parental
responsibilities
to
his
child.
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of

Summers

McKinstry v, McKinstrv, 629 P.2d 1286, 1288
(1981) (quoting Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560
P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 1977)).
The law in Utah clearly gives the trial court jurisdiction
to find the natural parent give up parental rights to the child
in March of 1980, intending that the child was to be adopted.
Coupled

with

the

applicable

case

law

in the

State

of Utah,

the court found that the domicile of the minor child changed to
that of petitioners and accordingly, found it had jurisdiction
to decide the adoption matter.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN
IT FOUND THAT REMEDIAL AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES HAD BEEN PROVIDED
TO
THE
MOTHER
AND
PROVED
UNSUCCESSFUL.
25 U.S.C

§ 1912, sets out the requirements that must be

established before a child within the jurisdiction of the ICWA
may be placed for foster care or for adoption.

Subsection (b) of

that section provides as follows:
Any party seeking to effect the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child under State law
shall satisfy the court that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services
and
rehabilitative
programs
designed
to
prevent the break-up of the Indian family and
that those efforts have proved unsuccessful.
In the court's decision dated January 28, 1985, the court
spelit considerable time dealing with the issue of rehabilitative
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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services.

(R. 581-583, Exhibit "C" in the Appendix).

In the

court's ruling, the relevant facts are recited. The court noted
that the natural mother had transferred the care of the child to
the

child's

period.

Indian

grandmother

after

the

initial

six

month

The court found that the transfer was made because the

step-father was apparently abusing Jeremiah and did not like the
child because it was not his natural son. The court noted that
the step-father was not going to bother with the child and would
not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the child the
normal love that a father would give a child.
Of the large family that Cecelia Saunders had, the court
noted that there was only one sister who would take the child and
she was determined not to be fit.

As noted by the court, the

important testimony concerning the frustrated rehabilitation in
the case came from Miss Ella Shirley, a social worker on the
reservation.

Although the extended Indian family was discussed

the record clearly indicated the unsuitability of all the extended
family.
placed

The social worker testified the child would simply be
for adoption

with

another Navajo

family.

The

social

worker admitted, based upon those facts, that rehabilitation with
the natural family would have been discontinued and the child
placed with another Navajo family.
the

notes

of

the

case

worker

The social worker agreed from
that

the

natural
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mother

had

vacillated continually between wanting the child back and not
wanting the child.
Another social worker testified that the referral to the
social agencies was because Jeremiah was neglected.

The social

worker stated that they were interested in taking the child, but
after doing a thorough investigation of the sisters, they decided
that placement with those relatives would not work.

(Tr. II, p.

120, Exhibit "C" in the Appendix).
The most important illustration of the failure of any type
of rehabilitation of the natural mother and her family comes from
the

notes

of

the

social

agencies

working

with

the

family.

Attached to this Brief as Exhibit "B" are two pages of a social
worker's notes introduced as an Exhibit at trial.
attention is drawn to the note of June 7, 1983.

Particular

At that time,

both parties were looking for experts to testify in the case.
The notes for June 7, 1983, reveals the following with regard to
the willingness

of

experts retained

by

the Navajo Nation to

testify as to the stability of the Saunder's home:
Worker met with Dr. Thomas and Dr. Mellor on
possibilities of providing evaluation of the
family (Saunders). Both Dr's. were reluctant
to testify in court of the stability of the
Saunders family. They felt that it would be
unfair on behalf of the family and not be
able to express what may developed later, as a
result of Cecelia's family history.
Both
Dr's. do not want to testify in court, they
feel that this type of situation is not good
27
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for their profession.
I asked for names of
other possible contacts. The worker will look
into these contacts. (Emphasis added).
(R. 122-123).
Attached in the Brief as Exhibit "F" is a summary of the
Tribal Records which were prepared from the social worker's notes
themselves.

The summary clearly indicates that Cecelia had been

deceptive with the social agencies, that the family had a large
amount of problems in dealing with their off-spring and certainly
that the trial court's finding that rehabilitation efforts with
Cecelia had been unsuccessful was justified.

(R. 120-148, R.

494-505).
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY
DENYING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO
THE ORDER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBAL
COURT.
It is important to understand the chronology of the case as
it

relates

to

this

particular

point.

As

indicated

in

the

Statement of Facts, the Petition for Adoption was filed on May
29, 1980.

(R. 2-4).

The Navajo Nation's Motion to Dismiss and

Transfer Jurisdiction was filed on May 11, 1982.

(R. 12-15).

The trial court's first decision in the case came on July 14,
1982, after extensive briefing and argument by counsel for the
respective sides.

(R. 35).

The court took evidence on the

domicile issue which was reserved in the court's ruling, on April
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7,

1983,

(R. 92-94), and rendered

October 6, 1983.

(R. 181-184).

its decision and order on

The court expressly reserved in

the order dated October 6, 1983, the issue of whether or not
there was sufficient basis to terminate the parental rights of
the natural mother.
prepared

After the entry of that order, both sides

for trial on the termination

issue.

It is at that

juncture that the Navajo Nation apparently filed in the District
Court of the Navajo Nation in Windowrock District, Windowrock,
Arizona, a motion to invalidate the State action and for permanent
custody.

The motion is dated August 11, 1984, but was not filed

with the District Court of Utah until September 7, 1985.

(R.

198-374).
The Navajo Nation obtained an order from the District Court
of the Navajo Nation in Windowrock, Arizona, based upon their
motion on September 7, 1985.

(R. 375-376).

The return filed in

the case indicates that the Carters were served with the order
and motion on the 17th of August, 1984.

(R. 377). The trial on

the final elements of the case conducted on October 22 and 23,
1984.
The argument of the appellants that after litigating in the
Utah Courts from 1980 to 1984, the District Court in Utah should
simply dismiss the case and allow the Navajo Nation to go forward
in the tribal court when the first filings made in tribal court
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occurred over three years into the litigation conducted in the
State of Utah.

Needless to say, the contention of the Navajo

Nation that the District Court was required by the Full Faith and
Credit

Clause,

Article

IV,

Section

1

of

the

United

States

Constitution of the Navajo order the full faith and credit is
incredible.
Article

IV, Section

1 of the United

States

Constitution

provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state.11

In light of the fact that the issues of jurisdic-

tion and domicile were properly decided by the lower court some
eighteen months

prior

to the

filing

of the motion with

the

Navajo court, the Utah court's ruling on the basis of untimeliness
was wholly proper.

Furthermore, regardless of the timing of the

motion, an examination of the language and legislative history of
the ICWA indicates that no violation of the Act occurred.

25

U.S.C 1911 (d), of the ICWA states:
The United States [and] every state .
shall give full faith and credit to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child
custody proceedings to the same extent
that such entities give full faith and credit
to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of any other entity.
The clear import of this language is that states are required
to give the same full faith and credit to Indian tribal court
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orders and custody matters that they would to court orders of a
sister state.

This, apparently, was in response to conflicting

state court rulings as to whether Indian laws and judicial orders
were entitled to full faith and credit (e.g., compared Jim v. CIT
Financial Services Corporation, 86 N.M. 784, 527 P.2d 1222 (1974)
and In Re Adoption of Beuhl, 87 Wash. 2d 647, 555 P.2d

1334

(1976), with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571
P.2d 689 (Ariz. App., 1977) and Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380,
222 P.2d 624 (1950), or were only entitled to the same deference
of decisions of foreign nations, as a matter of comity.

Matter of

Marriage of Fox, 23 Ore. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975).
The language contained in 25 U.S.C. 1911 (d) was proposed in
H.R. 12533, the Bill which became the ICWA.

H.R. 12533 was a

rewriting of an earlier senate Bill, S.1214.
Congressional Administrative News, pp. 7530, 7564.

1978 U.S. Code
The version of

this section contained in S.1214 (section 105), stated:
In any child placement proceeding within the
scope of this Act . . . every state . .
shall give full faith and credit to the laws
of any Indian tribe applicable to a proceeding
under the Act and to any tribal court orders
relating to the custody of a child who is the
subject of such a proceeding.
Congressional Record, Vol. 123, part 29, p. 37225.

Thus,

the earlier language which would have required each state to give
full faith and credit, apparently across the board, to any tribal
31

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court

orders

regarding

Indian

child

custody,

was

changed

to

indicate that tribal court orders are entitled to the same full
faith and credit as orders from other states1 courts, but not
obtain a higher status so as to enable them to override the
judgments

and

orders

of

state

courts.

See

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Provisions

also,

Note, The

and Policy," 25

S.D. Law Review 98, 104, n. 49 (1980).
The pertinent question thus becomes to what degree a state
court before which the issue of personal jurisdiction has been
fully litigated, and the ruling entered thereon, must then give
full faith and credit to a long-subsequent ruling of another state
in effect reversing the first state's ruling and denying jurisdiction to that state.

Clearly, the full faith and credit clause

would not require the court of the first state to defer to a
contrary ruling of another state's court, and such a scenario, as
well as the Navajo Nations' reading of the ICWA in this regard,
would

violate

the

general

rule,

that

jurisdiction has been fully litigated

where

a

question

of

in the first court, the

issue may not be relitigated by collateral attack in state or
federal

courts

in another

state, e.g.

Fidelity

Standard

Life

Insurance Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Yadalia, 382
F. Supp. 956 (D.C. Georgia, 1974), aff'd., 510 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.,
1975), cert, den. 423 U.S. 864, 96 Sup. Ct. 125 (1975), Johnson v.
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\

McDole, 394 F. Supp. 1197 (D.C. La. 1975), app. disitu , 526 F.2d
710 (5th Cir. 1976).
As to the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction to
determine custody of a child present in the state:
A state has power to exercise judicial
jurisdiction to determine the custody, or to
appoint a guardian, of a person of a child
or adult,
a) who is domiciled in the state, or
b) who is present in the state or,
c) who is neither domiciled nor
present
in the state, if the
controversy is between two or more
persons who are personally subject
to the jurisdiction of the state.
Restatement

(Second) Conflict of Laws,

§ 79.

In this

matter, the State District Court of Utah properly exercised its
jurisdiction over a minor whom it determined to be a resident and
domiciled within the state.

It is respectfully submitted that the

holding of the trial court was not at variance with 25 U.S.C. 1911
(a) , which pertains to tribal court jurisdiction
children residing or domiciled within reservations.

over Indian
The Utah

court clearly would not have been required to relinquish jurisdiction based upon the court order of a sister state entered after
the jurisdictional issue had already been litigated, and under the
terms of 25 U.S.C. 1911 (d), was not required to do so in light of
the tribal court order.

If the State court found that the tribal
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court's jurisdiction over the matter was not exclusive, it had no
obligation to give full faith and credit to any ruling to the
contrary.

State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555 (Me. 1973).

fact that the tribal court declared

The mere

itself to have exclusive

jurisdiction (especially subsequent to the state court's ruling)
does not require the state court to follow such a declaration.
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution does not prohibit a state
from exercising jurisdiction in a transitory
cause of action even though a sister state
has provided that action and the particular
claim shall not be brought outside its
territory.
Cain v. Cain, 646 P.2d 505, 506 (Mont. 1982).
POINT V
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
CECELIA SAUNDERS WAS PROPER.
In

evaluating

whether

or

not

the

trial

court

properly

terminated the parental rights of the natural mother, reference
must be made to the ICWA itself.
burdens

that

must

be

met

by

25 U.S.C § 1912 deals with the
petitioners

in

an

involuntary

proceeding before the parental rights of a natural parent may be
terminated.

Subsection

(c) requires that all reports or other

documents filed with the court are to be available to each party
to a foster care placement or termination of parental rights
proceeding.

Section (d) of § 1912 requires a party seeking to
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affect the termination of parental rights to satisfy the court
that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the break-up of
the Indian family and further prove that those efforts have been
unsuccessFul.

That point has been addressed above.

Additionally,

Section (f) of § 1912 provides as follows:
No termination of parental rights may be
ordered in such proceeding in the absence of
a determination, supported by evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent of Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional of physical damage to the child.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
argument

In Point VI of the appellant's Brief, the

is made that before the parental

rights

of

Cecelia

Saunders could be terminated, there must be a finding by the
trial court that she was unfit.

However, the ICWA in the Section

set out above, do not require a finding
appropriate

sections

proceedings

supported

clearly
by

require

evidence

of unfitness.

there

beyond

a

be

proof

in

The
the

reasonable doubt,

including testimony of a qualified witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
After that test has been met, it is the burden of the petitioners
to meet the tests applicable within the State of Utah.
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The argument of the Navajo Tribe is totally inapplicable to
the facts of this case because parental unfitness, besides not
being required by the ICWA, is not required in Utah before a
court can terminate the rights of a natural parent.

Utah Code

Ann. § 78-38-48 states in pertinent part as follows:
The court may decree an involuntary termination of all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the court finds either
(a), (b), (c) or (d) as follows: . . .
(b)
that the parent or parents
have abandoned the child.
It is
prima facie evidence of abandonment
that the parent or parents, although
having legal custody of the child,
have surrendered physical custody
of the child, and for a period of
six months following the surrender
have not manifested to the child or
to
the
person
having
physical
custody of the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or
to make arrangements for the care
of the child. . . .
It is also interesting to note that the Utah Legislature has
amended Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-48 (a).

Prior to its amendment in

1985, the Code Section listed a number of different conditions
under which the court could consider the child's best interest.
Subsection (a) now provides:
That the parent or parents are unfit or
incompetent by reason of conduct or condition
which is seriously detrimental to the child.
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In this particular case, the court found the requisites of
both Subsections (a) and (b) .

The trial court explicitly found

that the natural mother, Cecelia Saunders, abandoned the child.
Having

made

that

determination,

the

court

was

then

free to

examine whether or not there was evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including

the testimony

of qualified

expert witnesses,

that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian was likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child.
The

records of

the

social

records

of the Navajo Tribe,

attached in the Appendix as Exhibit "E", clearly establish that
Cecelia Saunders tried for a number of months to hide the fact
that the child had been given for adoption by stating that the
child was only on temporary placement.

There is no question that

the child was abandoned for a period far in excess of six months
and further the evidence is uncontroverted that for a period of
six months after the child was given to the Carters, there was
not attempt or expression of intention on behalf of the natural
mother to resume custody and control of the minor child.
inasmuch

as

abandonment,

on

an

individual

basis

Thus,

under

the

termination statute, has been proven to the trial court, there
was

absolutely

no

need

to

establish

a

separate

"unfitness" of the natural mother.
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basis

of

This Court has ruled on the particular question of whether
or

not

anything

but

abandonment

terminate parental rights.
P.2d

1364

(Utah

question.

1982),

must

be

shown

in

order

to

In a recent decision In Re J.P., 648
the

Court

was

faced

with

In that case, the facts are as follows.

a

similar

On May 20,

1980, the Division of Family Services filed a petition with the
juvenile court asking that the parental rights of the natural
mother of J.P. be terminated.
dismiss

the

petition

unconstitutional.

The mother filed a motion to

stating

that

the

statute

was

The lower court granted the mother's motion to

dismiss on the constitutional issues and the DFS appeal.
In analyzing whether or not the statute was unconstitutional,
the

Court

started with

legislative change.
after

statehood

an analysis of the

law prior to the

The Court noted that the first statutory law

allowed

a mother

and

father

to

prevent

the

adoption of their child unless the parent was adjudged guilty of
desertion.

In Re J.P. .

supra., at 1366, see also, R.F. Utah,

1898 § 4.
The

Supreme

Court

then

noted

that

the

current

Adoption

Statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4, § 78-30-5 (1953 as amended),
permit the adoption without a natural parent's consent if the
parent "has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child
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on account of cruelty, neglect, or desertion, or has abandoned
the child."

See In Re. J.P, at 1367.

The Court then noted that the Juvenile Court Act of 1965
empowered the juvenile court to terminate the rights of a natural
parent who was either unfit or incompetent, or had abandoned the
child.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-48

Utah Laws.

(1953) Chapter 40, 1980

As summarized by Justice Oaks in the decision in In

Re J.P.:
As in the Adoption Statute, the rights of
parents were respected [referring to prior
laws in Utah]:
No parent could be deprived
of his or her parental rights without a prior
showing of unfitness, abandonment, or a
substantial neglect.
So long as a parent's
conduct remains within those broad bounds,
the court was not empowered to terminate
the parent-child relationship.
(Emphasis
added.)
In Re J.P. , at 1367. In that regard, the Court noted that it had
always been willing to uphold the termination of parental rights
upon a proper showing of abandonment or failure to support.

See

Adoption of McKinstry v. McKinstrv, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1981); In
Re J.P. , at supra. , at 1367; State In Re Oraill v. Thompson, 636
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1981).

In all of those cases, the Supreme Court

upheld an adoption where the father had not provided support or
contacted the child for a period of time and also in the case in
which a mother who had not contacted the children was deemed to
have abandoned them.
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In conclusion, Justice Oaks stated in the J.P. decision as
follows:
We do not suggest that the Constitution
relegates a child to the status of a mere
chattel, to be treated or mistreated by his
or her parents according to their pleasure.
Consistent with all the principles discussed
above, a parent shown by clear and convincing
evidence to be unfit, abandoning, or substantially neglectful, can be
permanently
deprived of all parental rights.
[citing
cases].
In Re J.P., supra, at 1377.
So

that

abandonment,

there

is

reference

no
must

question

as

to

be

to

Sommers

made

what

constitutes
Children

Welffenstein, 560 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1977):
Whether or not there has been abandonment
within the meaning of the Statute is to be
determined objectively, taking into account
not only the verbal expressions of the
natural parents, but their conduct as parents
as well . . . abandonment consists of conduct
on the part of the parent which implies a
conscious disregard of the obligations owed
by a parent to the child, leading the distruction of the parent-child relationship.
Id. at 1159.

Justice Oaks writing that decision, then stated:

Abandonment may also be proved in subjective
terms as where "the parent has either
expressed
an intention or so conducted
himself as to clearly indicate an intention to
relinquish rights and reject parental responsibilities to the child. [citing cases]."
Id., at 1159.
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v.

As it relates to the evidence actually introduced at trial,
the petitioners called numerous witnesses.

Linda Coray, Lynn F.

Coray,

Orton

Virginia

relative

to

the

Lewis,

and

Kathleen

relationship

parents, Dan and Pat Carter.

A.

between

all

Michael

testified

Carter

and

his

The evidence of the strong relation-

ship between Michael Carter and his parents was uncontroverted.
All of the witnesses testified as to the devastating effects by
the change of the childfs custody to some individual located on
the Reservation would cause.

Also for the petitioners was allowed

to proffer the evidence of the petitioners Mr. Dan Carter and Mrs.
Patricia Carter.

Also, the testimony of Chad Carter and Mr. A.

G. Hawkins was proffered to the court in the proffer, was accepted
by court and counsel.
As

it

presented
heard.

related

almost

all

to

the

expert

of the expert

testimony,

the

testimony

petitioners

that the Court

The first expert called was Paul Stephen Buckingham who

received his Bachelors in Science and Psychology

from Brigham

Young University in 1972, and received a Masters of Social Work
from the University of Utah in 1974.
obtained was in social work.

The Masters Degree he

Mr. Buckingham was employed by the

LDS Social Services in the capacity of a clinical worker.
Mr. Buckingham's experience included employment between 1974
and 1976 as a bilingual psychiatric social worker for the Spanish

41

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

speaking population in Weber County and also was the director of
programs for Weber County Mental Health in the Spanish speaking
unit.

Mr, Buckingham related to the court how he was employed by

the LDS Social Services as a case worker in the Indian Placement
Program in which Navajo children were placed for the scholastics
school year on a voluntary basis.

Mr. Buckingham was directly

involved with the placement of Navajo children for two years and
during that time would meet on a monthly basis with children to
assess their progress in school and their adjustments and feelings
about the home that they were in.
Mr.
Carter.

Buckingham

interviewed

(Tr. Ill 59-61).
the

petitioners

and

Michael

He found no signs of depression or identity crisis.

Ill, p. 65) .

(Tr.

He found the family (Dan, Pat and Michael) close

and to be extremely bonded.

(Tr. Ill, p. 68) .

Mr. Buckingham

found that to return the child to the Reservation would cause, at
worse, "tremendous psychological damage, emotional damage, from
the fact that he had been taken from the home that he loved and
bonded to and put in a home where there was a very lost [sic]
potential at the very least for neglect and at the very most a
physical abuse" (Tr. Ill, at 77).
experience

and

training, he

In light of Mr. Buckingham

certainly was

a competent

witness to testify on the issues raised by the ICWA.
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expert
In the

Matter of K.A.B.E and K. B. E., 325 N.W. 2d 840 (S.D. 1982); In
Re The Welfare of Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. App. 1982).
The next expert who testified was Dr. Robert M. Crist.

Dr.

Robert M. Crist attended the University of Utah Medical School in
1962.

He completed

a rotating

internship

at the Holy Cross

Hospital from July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963.

Dr. Crist completed

a psychiatric residency at the University of California at Los
Angeles from July 1, 1963 to June 30, 1966.

Dr. Crist has been

involved in the private practice of psychiatry from July 1, 1966
to the present.
qualifications.

Dr. Crist testified at trial relative to his
(Tr. Ill, pp. 126-128).

Dr. Crist talked with

Dan and Pat Carter and also the minor child and also performed an
evaluation that was necessary to render a psychiatric opinion in
the case.

(Tr. Ill, p. 129).

For stating the opinion rendered

by Dr. Crist, it is important to note that Dr. Crist experience
included several post concerned with the issue of integration
into the anglo-American culture by minority groups.

(Tr. Ill,

pp. 129-120).
Dr. Crist testified that the Carters were a stable couple
and that they were eager to provide a home for the child, and
that the nurture and stimulation provided by them was more than
most

couple

were

capable

of.

(Tr.

Ill,

pp.

131-132).

In

addressing the question of what impact the taking of the child
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from the Carter home back to the Reservation would cause, Dr.
Crist stated as follows:
I think the likelihood of that [serious
emotional damage] is very great that you
would be rupturing the child-parent bond
which is one of the primary necessary developments in young people and children. He would
be placing him in a new strange environment
for him.
...
(Tr. Ill, p. 135).
irreparable.

Dr. Crist testified that the damage would be

(Tr. Ill, pp. 135-136).

Dr. Robert J. Howell then testified for the petitioners.

A

copy of Dr. Howell's report is marked as Exhibit 2 to the trial.
Without restating all that is contained in the Exhibit, Dr. Howell
has received his Ph.D and is a diplomat in clinical psychology,
clinical hypnosis, and

forensic psychology.

His professional

experience includes that of a Full Professor of Psychology, Senior
Psychologist

at

the

Utah

State

Hospital,

Consultant

Senior

Psychologist and Supervisor of Diagnostic Training at the Utah
State

Hospital;

Research

Specialist,

Center

for

Training

in

Community Psychologist, Los Angeles, and many other professional
appointments.

Additionally,

Dr.

Howell

has

published

a

extensively as is outlined in Exhibit 2 to the trial.
Dr.

Howell,

after

Carters,

the

fourteen

page

hours

child,
report

and
to

of

work

also
the

the

and

after

natural

court which

44

interviewing

mother

rendered

is attached
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the
a

in the

Appendix as Exhibit M F."

After the workup that he performed, Dr.

Howell performed a professional opinion as the effects removing
the child from his present circumstances:
It is my opinion that the probability of the
emotional damage taken place which would
result from removing Michael from the Carter
home, for out weighs the potential conflict
as to Michael's not having a clear identity
of himself as an Indian, and yet, also
knowing he is not a Caucasian.
It is my
belief that the probability of emotional
damage is at a very high level certainty —
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, Dr. Howell's findings were as follows:
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no
memory of his life/ for two years and ten
months on the reservation.
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home
that he is now in and sees Mr. and Mrs.
Carter as his parents.
In my opinion, the
Carters are his psychological parents.
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be
emotionally damaged by taking him out of the
home.
The nearly five years that he has
spent with the Carters, especially when
considering the early age that he came with
them, clearly speaks to be important to his
continuing to live with them.
4.
I agree with Dr. Roll that efforts
should be made to inculcate in Michael in
appreciation for his heritage and I see no
reason why contact could not be effected
between Cecelia Saunders and Michael.
5. I could not find any evidence that
Michael was depressed, if he was depressed
when Dr. Rolls saw him, it is likely that
this is reaction to his fears that he would
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be taken away from the Carters. He told his
school teacher, Paula Fair, that he was going
to see a man to determine if he could keep
living with the Carters.
(Exhibit 3 to trial, Exhibit "F" in the Appendix).
In addition to the testimony of the experts regarding the
effect of removing the child from petitioners1 home, there is
extensive

testimony

relative

to

the

fitness

of

the

Indian

custodian which has been set out in this Brief and is particularly
identified in the Summary of the Tribal Records, Exhibit "E" in
the Appendix.
In the Matter of J.H.L & P.L.L.H., 360 N.W. 2d 350 (S.D.
1982), the court found that evidence of conduct of not only the
natural parents but also "other persons in and about the residence: may support a trial court's finding that severe emotional
or physical damage would be likely if the child were returned to
the natural parents.

Id. , at 651.

In the present case, the

record indicates that the child's grandmother and other members of
the extended family are alcoholics (Tr. II, pp. 23-25, 30) ; the
natural mother's husband did not like the child nor did he want
them in the marital relationship (Tr. II, pp. 21-23); the natural
mother willing gave up the child for adoption (Tr. II, p. 31) and
only

revoked

indicated

its

her

consent to adoption

disapproval

of

the

after the Navajo

adoption.

There

is

Tribe
also

testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the mother revoked
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her consent only after being subject to duress by the Navajo
Nation.

(Tr. II, pp. 60-62).

An Arizona court has held that an Indian mother who revokes
or relinquishes her parental rights is entitled to a return of
the child in the absence of evidence of her fitness of a parent
or any attempt to preserve the parent-child relationship.

In the

Matter of Appeal in Pima County, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981).
In that case, the court almost seemed to belittle the adoptive
parents'

argument

that

the

return

of

the

child

would

be

emotionally traumatic:
Any potential emotional trauma to the child
if the contemplated adoption is aborted was
ingenered by the conduct of the adoptive
parents not adhering to the mandates of the
Act.
Id., at 193.
The relevant facts in the present case are quite different
and distinguishable from the case cited above.

In that case, the

adoptive parents had custody of the child for only about four
months before the natural mother revoked her relinquishment.

At

the case at bar, the petitioners had custody of the child for a
full two years before

there was

indication

that the natural

mother would revoke her consent to adoption. At that time the
child has already developed emotional and psychological bonds with
the petitioners

and

it would

be unfair to punish
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the child

because

the

adoptive

parents

did

not

send

him

off

to

the

reservation immediately upon hearing that the biological mother
had changed her mind.
It

is respectfully

submitted

that the trial

court acted

proper in all respects in terminating the parental rights of the
natural mother.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the litigation which has
embroiled this young child should be brought to an end.

There is

simply no justification after hearing the testimony relative to
the bonding of the child with his adoptive parents to continue
this

matter

any

further.

The

testimony

at

trial

was

uncontroverted that the child does not have any memory whatsoever
of his life on the reservation; could not even recognize his
Indian mother and had no desire for anything but to know that he
was secure in his home with the Carters.

The litigation relative

to this child started in 1980, was escalated by the filing of
motions in 1982, and finally came to some conclusion that result
in the granting of the petition of adoption on February 4, 1985.
The child has been sealed, ecclesiastically, to the Carters in the
LDS Church.

After that significant event occurred in their lives,

the Navajo Nation filed suit against Judge David Sam, the Fourth
District Court, and the Carters not only seeking to invalidate the
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State Court proceeding, but seeking damages against the Carters.
In

essence, it was

continue

to

invade

not
the

sufficient
child's

for the Navajo Nation to

security

in

addition

to

the

thousands of dollars that the Carters have spent in defending
their right to maintain a relationship with the child, the Navajo
Nation wanted the Court to impose damages against them.

A copy

of Judge J. Thomas Greens' decision in Federal Court dismissing
the lawsuit is attached in the Appendix as Exhibit "G."
When all is said and done, the Court has before it the
future of a young boy who is totally innocent to the circumstances
around him.

One would think that a child whose character and

personality is so dear to his parents*and those persons who have
known him

should have the right to a few years of pleasant

adolescence in which he is secure in his home and in his parents.
It is respectfully

submitted

that the trial

court acted

properly, that the petition for adoption was properly granted,
and that the appeal of the Navajo Nation should be dismissed and
the trial court affirmed.
DATED this ^ 4

day of October, 1985.

-T^^Ly' /i\ ^/L~^
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, ton
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Respondents

49

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I have served
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent
upon the following, by mailing the same, on the "2-^/
October, 1985:
Mary Ellen Sloan
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

-^C^f-Jst.
RICHARD B. JOHNSON

50

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J/L

day of

A D D E N D U M

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT

" i r'

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,.„ ,r »*i <\: '}'

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

U:U

'""'

,..;...•
1 11

.MiAiM-.H^'- -

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF THE

\

ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH

']

HALLOWAY

"3&C

"::

D

''

R U L I N G
# 19,981

|
i

Having now considered the arguments of counsel and the memoranda of law on file herein together with the applicable provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, the court now holds, rules,
and finds as follows:
R U L I N G
Under t h e f a c t s a n d 4 c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e a s have now
b e e n p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t and c o n s i d e r i n g t h e a p p l i c a b l e law a s
i t r e l a t e s t h e r e t o , t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e d o m i c i l e of t h e minor c h i l d
t o be t h a t of t h e p e t i t i o n e r s .
T h i s f i n d i n g " i s b a s e d upon t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s r e s i d e n c e a p p e a r s t o have been v o l u n t a r i l y and
p u r p o s e l y removed from t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r , g r a n d m o t h e r , and r e s e r v a t i o n
to the p e t i t i o n e r s .
I n view of t h a t f a c t and t h e l o n g p e r i o d of t i m e
t h a t the c h i l d has been w i t h the p e t i t i o n e r s , t h i s c o u r t f i n d s t h a t
a p p a r e n t "good c a u s e " e x i s t s f o r t h i s c o u r t t o t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n and
t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e I n d i a n C h i l d W e l f a r e Act h a v e a t t h i s
s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e e n s a t i s f i e d i n o r d e r t o do s o .
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s c o u r t w i l l p r o c e e d t o now t a k e e v i d e n c e on t h e
i s s u e of d o m i c i l e i f any f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e need be p r e s e n t e d as t o
t h a t i s s u e and a l s o on t h e i s s u e of abandonment by t h e n a t u r a l m o t h e r .
E v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g on t h o s e i s s u e s w i l l be s e t upon a p p l i c a t i o n of
e i t h e r p a r t y which a p p l i c a t i o n s h o u l d a l s o i n d i c a t e t h e l e n g t h of
time e s t i m a t e d f o r s a i d h e a r i n g .
Temporary c u s t o d y of t h e minor
c h i l d t o r e m a i n w i t h t h e p e t i t i o n e r s u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e
court.
Dated t h i s

/ V * d a y of J u l y ,

1982.

dLu.
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6

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

7

STATE OF UTAH

8
9

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
O R D E R
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY,

10

A person under eighteen vears
11 of age,

Probate No. 19,981

12
This matter came on before the Court for hearing on the 7th of
13
April, 1983 and the 16th day of September, 1983.

The petitioners,

14
Dan Carter and Pat Carter were present at the April 7th hearing
15
and represented by their attorney, Richard B. Johnson.

The Navajo

16
Nation was present and represented by its attorneys, Craig Jay
17
Dorsay and Larry Kee Yazzie.

The Court, on the basis of testi-

18
rnonv, evidence and the argument of counsel, now makes and enters
19 !
the following Order:
20
1. In the Court's prior ruling of July 14, 1982, the Court gav|*
21
both sides the opportunitv to request an evidentiary hearing on the
22
issue of jurisdiction. The Court, after considering the evidence,
23
finds that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as an
24
adverse proceeding for termination of parental rights and adoption
25
of an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reserva26
tion of the Indian child's tribe.
27
2. The Court specifically finds that the child was taken from
28
29
30
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1 the reservation by a family member, with some of the family's con2 sent and delivered to the petitioners, for adoption.

The Court

3 finds that the transfer of the child to the petitioners by the
4 biological family of the child was done in what some members of the
5 family felt was the child's best interests. The Court finds that
6 no one in the family of the child protested placement of the child
7 with the petitioners.
8

3.

The Court finds that the relocation of the. child with the

9 petititoners was done with the intent to transfer to the Carters
10 full parental rights as it relates to the child and with the further
11 intent to abandon all parental rights in the child.
12

4.

The Court finds further that the natural mother and the

13 family have abandoned the child and that prior to the Court's
14 awarding of temporary custody of the minor child to the petitioners

H

<&
in
w £S -o *
S
0 u> to W

15 on July 14, 1982, the petitioners stood in the position of loco

CO ^ to

dx *** o /A

"zS 16 jparentls to Jeremiah Halloway.
go g<»
B
5. The Court finds further that on the basis of the Court's
Q ^ ; « 17
3 Z

55 Ssi 18
determination of domicile and the Court's finding that the child
a. w

I!
DC

0

Q. H

19 had a residence with the petitioners in Utah Countv, State of Utah,
20 the Court finds further that there is good cause pursuant to
21 25 U.S.C.S. §1911(b) for this Court to retain jurisdiction based
22 upon the findings of the Court that there has been a long period of
23 time that the child has been with the petitioners; the fact that no
24 Indian custodian has been appointed and that the custody and
25
26
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parental rights to the child had been voluntarily relinquished by
2

the parents and family; that the child has had little contact with

3

the tribe for a significant period of time; that the child has not

4

resided on the reservation for a significant period of time and

5

that the child has significant contact with this district; and, that

6

the convenience and assessibility of witnesses best able to deter-

7 mine the status, condition and health of the child are located in
8 this district.
9

6.

The Court makes no ruling with respect to termination of

10 parental rights as it relates to Jeremiah Halloway, the Court
11 determining that the petitioners

must meet the burden of 25 U.S.C.S

12 51912(f) by proving beyond a resonable doubt from the evidence,
13 including testimonv of qualified expert witnesses, that the
14 continued custody of the child bv the parent or Indian custody is

!3

i<
&
!

- 10

I 9? •*
O (0
-i ,

°(0 s(9

!?S

CO <? Q)

.u E ^ O m
> u) g* i "
n
Z o § <
D Z m f*

»

go « • § &
i
n
Q

1 z

£

"• i -

15 likelv to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
16 child.

The Court will be guided by the Indian Child Welfare Act

17 25 U.S.C.S. §1901 et seq. and those matters contemplated by said
18 Act.

I 0) W

il§
o

19

7.

The Court finds that the natural mother has withdrawn her i

20 consent prior to the entry of a Decree of Adoption.
21

8.

Accordinglv, the Court orders that the matter be set for

22 hearing at a time convenient for counsel to determine whether or
23 not parental rights should be terminated.
24

9.

The Court notes the stipulation of the parties recognizing

25
26
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the rights of the Court to enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
2 Law and Decree in this matter after a hearing of all of the evidence
3

10.

The Court orders that the records previously ordered to

4 become part of the record on April 7, 1983 hearing be made part of
5 this record.
6

11.

All motions for sanctions are, as of the present time,

7 denied.
8

DATED this

C*

day of

er, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

9
10
11 APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JUDGE DAVID SAM

12
13
•s

;

14
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LARRY KEQ^TAZZIE
*^
Attorneys
for
Navajo
Nation
17
18
19
20

H
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21
22
23
24
25
26
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T COURT FOR UTAH'-XMNTrfp
i

''

c. i

r

TH''•"•-"- -..::; ;*

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
A D O P T I O N OF J E R E M I A H
HALLOWAY, A PERSON
UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF

'

]
;
(

D E C I S I O N

AGE
# 19,981

FEDERAL LAW
This case is before the Court on p e t i t i o n e r ' s Motion to T e r m i n a t e
the Parental

Rights of the Natural M o t h e r of Jeremiah Halloway, a

Navajo Indian Child.
Child Welfare Act.

The c o n t r o l l i n g

law in this case is the Indian

The portions of that act we are s p e c i f i c a l l y

con-

cerned with are the f o l l o w i n g :
25 U.S.C. S e c 1912(d)
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement
of, or t e r m i n a t i o n of parental rights t o , an Indian child
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services
and r e h a b i l i t a t i v e
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
and that these efforts have proved u n s u c c e s s f u l .
25 U.S.C. Sec. 1912(f)
No t e r m i n a t i o n of parental rights may be ordered in such
p r o c e e d i n g in the absence of a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , supported by
e v i d e n c e beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of
qualified expert w i t n e s s e s , that the continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physicial damage to the child.
The child was placed with the p e t i t i o n e r s on March 2 3 , 1980; the
biological mother consented to the adoption of the child on May 3 0 ,

1980.

The p e t i t i o n e r s notified the Navajo Nation of their intent to adopt the
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19,981

child and on April 30, 1982 the mother revoked her consent to the
adoption.

T e s t i m o n y was taken on these matters on April 7, 1983 and

trial was held on O c t o b e r 22, 1984.
T e s t i m o n y of experts concerning the effect of taking the child
from the p e t i t i o n e r ' s home and replacing him in the r e s e r v a t i o n
summarized

is

here.

Damage to the Child

Paul Steven

Buckingham

Mr. B u c k i n g h a m

interviewed the p e t i t i o n e r s and J e r e m i a h . He found

no signs of d e p r e s s i o n or identity c r i s i s .

(October t r a n s c r i p t

65).

He found them to be e x t r e m e l y bonded

68).

He found that to return the child to the r e s e r v a t i o n would

at worst "tremendous physhological

(October t r a n s c r i p t

page
page
cause

damage, emotional d a m a g e , from the

fact that he has been taken from the home that he felt loved and

bonded

to and put in a home where there was a wery

at

the yery

lost [ s i c ] potential

least for neglect and at the very most of physical

abuse."

(October t r a n s c r i p t page 77)
The Navajo Nation has challenged the t e s t i m o n y of Mr.

Buckingham

on the grounds that he did not have sufficient q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to testify
as an expert under the ICWA
out as f o l l o w s :

Mr. B u c k i n g h a m ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s were set

B a c h e l o r s Degree in Science and Psychology from BYU in

1972; M a s t e r s of Social Work from the University of Utah in 1974;
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# 19,981
Clinical Worker for L.D.S. Social Services for last eight y e a r s ;
case w o r k e r in the Indian Placement Program for Navajo c h i l d r e n .
has also worked with Navajo children on the r e s e r v a t i o n .
a Navajo youth in his home for the last five y e a r s .
qualifications

He

He has had

These are

ample

in light of In the M a t t e r of K . A . B . E . and K.B.E,

NW2d 840 (S.D. 1 9 8 2 ) .

In that case, the South Dakota Supreme

325

Court

found that a person who had worked as a social w o r k e r for over four
y e a r s , had a b a c h e l o r of arts degree in social work and had

contact

with Indians on a regular basis was a qualified expert under the

ICWA.

See also, In re the Welfare of Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. A p p .

1982).

Dr. Robert M. Crist

Dr. Robert M. Crist also testified regarding the effect of returning the child to the r e s e r v a t i o n .
that is very

He stated that "the likelihood

great that you would be rupturing the c h i l d - p a r e n t

which is one of those primary necessary d e v e l o p m e n t s
and c h i l d r e n .
for him.

in young

You would be placing him in a new strange

of

bond

people

environment

There would be a q u e s t i o n s as to who would be the parent

figures in the f u t u r e . "

Again, the Navajo Nation challenged

Crist's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to testify as an e x p e r t .

Dr.

While the w i t n e s s ' s

e x p e r i e n c e had not been with Navajo people per se, his work in psychiatry and m i n o r i t y integration are sufficient to qualify him to
testify.
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Dr. Samuel

Roll

Dr. Samuel R o l l , called on b e h a l f of the Navajo N a t i o n ,

submitted

a report (Exhibit 4) based upon his e v a l u a t i o n of the child and background

i n f o r m a t i o n supplied by counsel for the t r i b e .

Dr. Roll

found

that the child is mildly d e p r e s s e d and that he has a n e g a t i v e image of
Indians.

With regard to the child's a t t a c h m e n t to the p e t i t i o n e r s ,

Dr. Roll found

that

J e r e m i a h is yery c l o s e l y and w a r m l y bonded and attached
to the C a r t e r s . It is clear that he sees them as faithful
and powerful sources of s t i m u l a t i o n , c o n f i d e n c e and s e c u r i t y .
He also looks to them for p o s i t i v e p r o d u c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e .
His
love and bonding to them \/ery s t r o n g l y speaks to the value that
the r e l a t i o n s h i p with the C a r t e r s has for him.
It will be ext r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t for Jeremiah to make a break with the C a r t e r s
and will cause c o n s i d e r a b l e pain and a period of painful mourning.
It is clear that J e r e m i a h will not be able to go through
this period s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h o u t close s u p e r v i s i o n and professional help.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Dr. Roll's o p i n i o n was that the child should be taken
from the p e t i t i o n e r ' s home and replaced with the tribe so that he would
not suffer an identify crisis in his a d o l e s c e n t y e a r s .

Dr. Robert J.

Howell

T e s t i m o n y and a report (Exhibit 3) prepared by Dr. Robert
Howell

reveal that after his e x a m i n a t i o n of the child, and

J.

conversa-

tions with the child's t e a c h e r s and the p e t i t i o n e r s , he formed a prof e s s i o n a l o p i n i o n as to the effect of r e m o v i n g the child from his
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present

circumstances:

It is my opinion that the p r o b a b i l i t y of emotional
damage taking place which would result from removing Michael
from the Carter home, far o u t w e i g h s the potential conflict
QS to M i c h a e l C ' s ] not having a clear identity of himself as
an Indian, and yet, also knowing that he is not C a u c a s i o n .
It is my belief that the p r o b a b i l i t y of emotional damage is
at a \/ery high level of c e r t a i n t y - - b e y o n d a reasonable doubt.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , Dr. Howell's findings were as f o l l o w s :
1. Michael is a bright y o u n g s t e r who has no memory of
his life for, two years and ten months on the r e s e r v a t i o n .
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home that he is now
in and sees Mr. and M r s . Carter as his p a r e n t s . In my o p i n i o n ,
the Carters are his p s y c h o l o g i c a l p a r e n t s .
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be e m o t i o n a l l y
damaged by taking him out of the h o m e . The nearly five years
that he has spent with the C a r t e r s , e s p e c i a l l y , when c o n s i d e r ing the early age that he came with them, clearly speaks to
the importance of his c o n t i n u i n g to live with them.
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that effort should be made to
inculcate in Michael an a p p r e c i a t i o n for his h e r i t a g e , and I
see no reason why contact could not be effected between Cecelia
Sanders and M i c h a e l .
5. I could not find any evidence that Michael was depressed, if he was depressed when Dr. Roll saw him, it is likely
that this was a reaction to his fears that he would be taken
away from the C a r t e r s . He told his school t e a c h e r Paula Farrer
that he was going to see a man to d e t e r m i n e if he could keep
living with the c a r t e r s .
In addition to the t e s t i m o n y of e x p e r t s regarding the effect of
removing the child from the p e t i t i o n e r ' s h o m e , there was (in

the April

h e a r i n g ) some t e s t i m o n y regarding the fitness of his Indian c u s t o d i a n s .
In In the Matter of J.H.L. and P.L.L.H., 316 NW2d 650 (S.D. 1 9 8 2 ) ,
the court found that e v i d e n c e of conduct of not only the natural
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but also "other persons in and about the residence' 1 may support a
trial court's finding that seyere

emotional or physical damage would

be likely if the child were returned to the natural p a r e n t s . _I_d.at 6 5 1 .
In the present case, the record indicates that the child's

grandmother

and o t h e r members of the extended family are a l c o h o l i c (April
pages 2 3 - 2 5 , 3 0 ) ;

transcript

the natural m o t h e r ' s husband did not like the child

nor did he want him in the marital r e l a t i o n s h i p (April t r a n s c r i p t

pages

2 1 - 2 3 ) ; the natural mother w i l l i n g l y gave the child up for adoption
(April t r a n s c r i p t page 31) and only revoked her consent to the

adoption

after the Navajo Nation indicated its disapproval of the a d o p t i o n .
There is also t e s t i m o n y , although not u n c o n t r o v e r t e d , that the m o t h e r
revoked her consent only after being subject to duress by the Navajo
N a t i o n . (April transcript pages

60-62).

An Arizona court has held that an Indian m o t h e r who revokes her
r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of parental

rights is e n t i t l e d to the return of the

child in the absence of e v i d e n c e of her fitness as a parent or any
attempt to p r e s e r v e the p a r e n t - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p .
Pima County, 635 P.2d 187 ( A r i z . A p p . 1 9 8 1 ) .

M a t t e r of Appeal

In t h a t - c a s e , the court

also seemed to b e l i t t l e the adoptive p a r e n t ' s argument that return of
the child would be e m o t i o n a l l y

traumatic:

Any potential emotional trauma to the child if the contemplated adoption is aborted was e n g e n d e r e d by the conduct
of the adoptive p a r e n t s not adhering to the m a n d a t e s of the
Act.
Id. at 193.
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The relevant facts in the present case are quite different and

distinguishable from Matter of Appeal.

In that case the adoptive parent;

had had custody of the child for only about four months before the natural mother revoked her relinquishment.

In the case at bar, the pe-

titioners had custody of the child for a full two years before there
was any indication that.the natural mother would revoke her consent to
the adoption.

At that time the child had already developed emotional

and psychological bonds with the petitioners and it would be unfair to
punish the child because the adoptive parents did not send him off to
the reservation immediately upon hearing that the biological mother had
changed her mind.
Rehabilitative

Efforts

In the first hearing conducted on April 7, 1983, the natural
mother testified that the primary care of Jeremiah after the initial
six month period was with the child's Indian grandmother (Page 2 0 ) .
She testified that at the time physical custody of the child was transferred to the grandmother, the step-father was apparently
Jeremiah.
20).

abusing

He did not like the child because it was not his son (Page

In addition, he stated he was not going to bother with the child

and would not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the child
the normal love that a father would give a child (Pages 22-23).
The mother testified that there was only one sister who would take
the child and she was determined not to be fit (Pages 4 5 - 4 6 ) .
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The most important testimony concerning the frustrated rehabil-

itation in the case comes from Ms. Ella Shirley. On page 86 of the
transcript, she explains the shared care concept.

In her testimony,

she stated that if the natural parents could not take care of the child,
then the extended family would then be charged with the care.

Ms.

Shirley testified specifically that there was a maternal aunt and
sister who could be used.

However, the record clearly indicates the

unsuitabi lity of all of the extended family.

On page 108 of the trans-

cript, the social worker was asked questions as to what decision she
would have made as far as rehabilitation of the family unit or placement in 1980.

Starting on page 109 she was asked that if the facts

revealed that the members of the extended family who wanted the child
were not fit custodians, would adoption outside the Tribe be considered.
The social worker testified that they would simply place the child with
another Navajo family.

The social worker admits based upon those facts,

rehabilitation with the natural family would have been discontinued
the child would have been placed with another Navajo family.

and

The social

worker agreed that from the notes of the case worker it appeared that
the natural mother vascilated continually between wanting the child
back and not wanting the child (Page 112).
Another social worker testified that the first referral to the
social agencies was because Jeremiah was neglected (Page 119).

The

social worker stated that "they were interested in taking the child,
but after doing a thorough investigation of the sisters, we decided
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,

that placement with those relatives would not work (Page 1 2 0 ) .
A c c o r d i n g l y , the court finds that the burden of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and
working with the family has been met.
STATE LAW
In addition to the provisions of the ICWA, the State of Utah has
set forth certain r e q u i r e m e n t s which must be met before the rights of
a parent may be t e r m i n a t e d .

One of the things that satisfy state re-

q u i r e m e n t s for t e r m i n a t i o n is a b a n d o n m e n t .

Utah Code Annotated

Sec.

7 8 - 3 a - 4 8 ( 1 ) states in relevant part:
The court may decree an involuntary t e r m i n a t i o n of all parental
rights with respect to one or both parents if the court finds . .
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned the child.
It
shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or
p a r e n t s , although having legal custody of the child have surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period of six
months f o l l o w i n g such surrender have not m a n i f e s t e d to the child
or to the person having the physical custody of the child a firm
intention to resume physical custody or to make a r r a n g e m e n t s for
the care of the chiId . . .
Under,

the guidelines laid down by the above statute, the

natural m o t h e r ' s sustained absence of any showing of interest in the
child for a two year period e s t a b l i s h e s prima facie evidence of abandonment.
In State v. J.T, 578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978) the State D i v i s i o n
of Family Services had placed children of the litigant mother in
foster homes after she had released them to the agency.
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attempts to remain in contact with her c h i l d r e n , the state refused to
tell her where the two youngest w e r e .

C o n s e q u e n t l y , she had no contact

with them for two and o n e - h a l f y e a r s .

E v e n t u a l l y , when the mother

sought custody of the children, the State sought to terminate her
parental rights on the basis of a b a n d o n m e n t .

The Supreme Court found

that there could be no abandonment where e v e r y t i m e the parent sought to
see the children she was denied v i s i t a t i o n .
In the case before the court, the m o t h e r knew that the p e t i t i o n e r s
had the child and at all times relevant to this action their phone
number and address were 1isted in the t e l e p h o n e d i r e c t o r y , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
she made no attempt to contact the child.
Conclusion
In light of the f o r e g o i n g , the court finds 1)

that the e v i d e n c e

(including expert t e s t i m o n y ) e s t a b l i s h e d beyond a reasonable doubt
that to return Jeremiah to his Indian c u s t o d i a n s would result in serious
emotional or physical damage to him; 2)

that active efforts have been

u n d e r t a k e n to attempt the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the Indian family and have
failed; and 3)

that the biological m o t h e r k n o w i n g l y and v o l u n t a r i l y

abandoned the child as defined in Utah Code Annoted Sec. 7 8 - 3 a - 4 8 ( l ) .
A c c o r d i n g l y , the amended petition of adoption is g r a n t e d .
Dated this

JL}1?

day of January, 1985.

/JLz^uL^D I S T R I C T JUDGE

cc:
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H4LL0WAY, Jeremiah

F?2-H7

I Tanning on movinr next door to 1 he :;o'<nh ho.-jn, ,",he is rjvinr,
home to Art & Cecelia,

her prwvnt

In conversing with Art & Cecelia they still rant to try and /*et Jeremiah
back. They feel that they are willing to continue with the present situation
in court. In terms of whether they had sought help from there NAC. The
family was still planning this. They still would like Mr. Yazzie, myself
and Mr. Dorsay to participate in this ritual0 They feel that this can
better prepare all of us emotional. Cecelia has deep hopes of Jeremiah
returning, with their home. Jeremiah and his little brother will be roomed
in their own room. The Saunders are now looking for furnitures.
lb

C. Saunders came into office with family. In our meeting we discussed the
importance of getting an evaluation 6n the family. It was suggested that Cecelia
and Arthur have a psychological evaluation completed to determined there
capability as parents. The response from the Saunders was positive. They are
willing to come into Gallup to met with any psychologist to begin the evaluation. It was also suggested that the psychologist make a homevisit and visit
with the family do better determine their ability to be good parents.
The family was also interested in knowing whether contact was made with
another psychologist to testify in court. Unfortunately the Psych., Dr.
Dorsay had contacted did not want to testify against the LDS Church. He
is a strong adovate for placement Indian children in Indian homes, but
does not want to testify against the church. (It was learned he is a
follower of the Morman belief). Presently.Mr. Dorsay is trying to locate
another Psych, that may be able to helP us. The Saunders want to be informed of any further information that may come up.
lb
The Saunders.were in the office today. They were wondering if any court date
had been set. I was not familiar with a date. The Saunders were also wanted.
to know if any arrangements have been made for the Psychological evaluation.
Presently they have gotten a new car and are able to make any appointment.
I had attempted to contact Dr. Thomas, but learned he was on training in
Albuquerque. Worker will contact Dr. Thomas next week to refer evaluation to
him. The Saunders are also planning on have a prayer meeting for Jeremiah
possible in mid July. Arthur and his mother are planning on traveling in to
Texas to pick up some medicine for the up coming meeting. The family will be
free anytime after the week of the 18th. Worker will notified the family when
arrangements are made.
The Saunders a very difficult time, she made them bring in a list of jobs,
they had looked into. The family will be recieveing $T36.00 every two (2)
weeks. Their initial grant is $217.00.
And finally, the family would like for Mr Dorday to make a home visit. They
want for him to see how they have prepared for Jeremiah's return. Worker
will contact Dorsay
lb
Worker met with Dr. Thomas and Dr. Muller on possibilities of providing
evaluation of the family (Saunder). Both Dr's. were relunctant to testify
in court of the
stability of the Saunder family. Law
They
felt that it would
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wh^t.rmy (1r,v-loped l a t e r , ns a r e s u l t of Cocci in1;; f-uujly hi.-; ory. i\>i h
L r ' n . do not v;nnt t o t e s t i f y in court, they fee] Uj;il t h i s type of
s i t u a t i o n i s not //ood for t h e i r profession. 1 ask for names of other
possible contacts. Worker will look i n t o these contacts,
lb

10.P3

Home visit made with Mr. Yazzie. He spoke with Cecelia and briefed her
on what to expect from Utah..He also reassured her that she really did
not have much to worry about. Mr. Yazzie has strong feelings of getting
this case transferred. Cecelia's first choice was that of guardianship
she wanted contact with the child. Uer second choice was to have him return
should they decide not to go with her terms.- It was now understood that
her case would be contested0 Cecelia seem confident with her choic of
remain steadfast to getting Jeremiah return.

22-83

Worker made home vist to remind Mrs. Saunders that I will be coming by
early Thursday morning, to pick her up. we will be returning Saturday
morning. Cecelia still has hope that her child will be returned.

24-83 ==

Arrived Ms. Saunders' home at 8:30 AM begin, trip to Prove. Most of our
talk covered issues of Cecelia's childhood. Arrive Provo, 6:30 PM. Cecelia
had little money, so we spend the night in the same room. No one was
contacted at the court house as our arrival.
lb

55-83

' Hearing, present at the hearing were the Carters, Jeremiah Halloway,
Polly Ann Dick, Larry K Yazzie, Cecelia Saunders and myself. (Prior to
our meeting, I contacted the court house and learned the hearing had been moved
up to 1:30 PM) e
In grief Mr. Johnson, sttorney for the Carters, argued issues involving
abandonment and domcile. Mr. Yazzie!s respons'e.was rather neverously
exhabit, he had one real through answer for Mr. Johnson's comments
regarding domicle. Both Mr.. Yazzie and myself felt that this would become
an issue long before appearing in court0 Questions regarding how does the
Tribe define domocile? Is domocile that of the natural mother? As a
result, Johnson left good points to retain jursicdiction, especially
with the question's regarding where is the domicle of the child. In
essence, Mr. Yazzie fail to define the tribes terms of domicle. In
close the Honorable Sam gave ten (10) to response to the issues
developed from this hearing. At that time he will determine wheather "Good
Cause" is evident to retain jursidiction. Upon learning of his decision,
we shall either:
1. Make arrangements to return Jeremiah or
2. Request for an Evidenary Hearing to dtermine final status of Jeremiah*
Upon closure, Cecelia was only able to see Jeremiah, she was unable to
talk or hold him. From viewing Jeremiah he appears to be in good care.
He is tall and chubby, he held fast to his custodian. The family seems
to be very closeo Cecelia broken down and cried as she watched them from
a very short distance. It was evident that Cecelia felt bad of not
being able to see or talke with Jeremiah.
Both client and worker left almost immediately after the hearing. Ke
return to Iyanbito at 11:00 PM.
• lb
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, FOR:
HOWARD. LEWIS 8c PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 EAST 3 0 0

NORTH STREET

P O BOX 778
PROVO. UTAH 8 4 6 0 3
TELEPHONE 373-6345

Attorneys for Petitioners
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

5

STATE OF UTAH

6

7 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : SUMMARY OF TRIBAL RECORDS
8 OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, DOB: 5/14/77
9 A person under eighteen years :
10

of age.

Probate No. 199810

11
COME NOW the petitioners Dan and Patricia Carter and submit the

12
13
14
15
16

following summary of the Social Worker file and exhibits previously
submitted to petitioners' counsel in answers to interrogatories.
Initially/ it should be noted that in making the summary/ the petitioners continue to object to the tribe's failure to mark and have
introduced as exhibits the records as they existed at the time of

17
the court hearing as opposed to submitting typed substitutes which

18
contain many disparities and omissions from that originally submitte

19
to the Court.
20
1.

Jeremiah Halloway was born on May 14/ 1977 and is an

21
enrolled Navajo child/ C#427,273.
22
2.

In a home visit on January 23/ 1982/ Cecilia Saunders/ the

23
natural mother of Jeremiah/ admitted that she gave her son Jeremiah

24
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1

away to her mother Bessie Begay in order to save her marriage with

2

Arthur Saunders.

3

monetary or any other type of support to Jeremiah.

4

stated that Arthur/ the step-father* disliked Jeremiah very much.

5

tr E
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Cecilia also

In a home visit to Rosita Dick/ a sister of Cecilia/ on

6

January 23/ 1980/ Rosita stressed that it wouldn't be a good idea

7

to give custody of Jeremiah to Bessie Begay/ her mother/ because of

8

her drinking problem.

9

sisters who were interested in obtaining legal custody of Jeremiah.

Rosita suggested that there were three

n w
i n P>

CD § IX)

10

However/ the social worker indicated that all three seemed to be

11

ineligible due to age or other reason.

12

case worker spoke with Bessie Begay who stated that she had adopted

13

two grandchildren in the past who were children of Minnie Williams.

14

She also stated there were fifteen members in the same household.

£*«
x X (*)

c <
o t: ui
D
2

So ° o g
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3.

Cecilia also stated that she did not provide any

Q.• >

0.

o

UJ

2

MI

During that same visit the

0. h

15

4.

In a report of January 23/ 1980/ a referral was made to the

16

tribe's social agencies indicating that Jeremiah was being neglected]

17

by his mother/ Cecilia Saunders.

18

constantly on the go with both grandparents on their sheep herding

19

job/ that Bessie had a drinking problem and that there were fifteen

20

members living in the same household.

21

5.

The child was reported to be

In a home visit on March 19/ 1980/ Bessie Begay indicated

22

that Jeremiah had been with them since birth/ contrary to the

23

natural mother's testimony that the care was given to the grandmothejr

24

at six months.
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4 Arthur Saunders, the step-father/ could not accept Jeremiah as his
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The report says that Cecilia gave consent to Polly-

6 Dick to place the child in Utah for several reasons.

The first

7 reason was that Bessie wasn't able to take care of the child because
8 she abuses alcohol heavily.

w <

The second reason the child was given

]J

9

r* u

! ir J

n w

i0 w

(X)

n

• S i x CD £ ^

' S l x£ » «
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She
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reported that Arthur dislikes the child very much/ that he often
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abuses and neglects the child which Cecilia cannot tolerate.

12

could not tolerate seeing her child being hurt. • The report conclude
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that Cecilia Saunders is from a big family.

14

but all are unstable and do not have a house of their own.
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fact, they have done the same thing, they have given up their childr
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to save their marriages.
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keep

1

Jeremiah or let him return to her maternal grandmother, Bessie

2

Begay.

3
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4

attorney at law from Lauren Bernally, a social worker, the letter

5

states that Cecilia's reason for consenting to the adoption is that

6

her present spouse has not accepted Jeremiah as a step-son.

7

rejected Jeremiah since his initial meeting with Cecilia.

8

letter states explicitly that "to complicate things more, she could

9

no longer tolerate the harsh treatment Arthur exhibited towards

He has
The

CD ? <0

10

her son, Jeremiah."

s<n

11

of social worker visits, Cecilia has changed her mind, her reasons

12

are somewhat easily swayed by different family members.

13

states that she is beginning to resent the somewhat "pestering" visi

14

with the social worker and spends more time away from home to avoid

15

contacts.
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In a letter dated March 22, 1982 to Richard Maxfield,

ro m

o </>
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24.
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The letter states that on almost every occasion

The letter

-

16

25.

The case worker's note for March 19, 1982 indicates that

17

the immediate family of Jeremiah have developed feelings of not

18

wanting to talk with the case worker.

19

26.

On September 1, 1982, Cecilia mentioned to the case

20

worker that it would also be very difficulty financially for them

21

to take Jeremiah back.

22

sion, the cas worker learned that Cecilia was fearful of continuing

23

with the hearing.

24

the things that the Carters gave him.

They have no money.

Later in the discus-

Cecilia felt that she could not give Jeremiah
Cecilia recalled the way
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1

Jeremiah appeared at the court hearing and how well dressed he was.

2

Most strikingly/ Cecilia recalled seeing Jeremiah and Pat Carter

3

walking out holding hands and Jeremiah referring to her as mom.

4
5
6

27.

On September 1, 1982/ the social worker noted that Cecilia]

was torn and confused and appears to be backing out.
28.

On September 17/ 1982/ Cecilia indicated to the social

7 worker that she had really thought about Jeremiah for the past week
i

8 and decided to go ahead and have the Carters adopt him.

Cecilia

$s
£1

9 indicated that they felt that they did not the return because

5
o 2

0 w
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10 Jeremiah was better situated in Utah.

11s < n

11 had spent in placement.
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Cecilia recalled the day she

She felt Jeremiah would be able to become

12 better educated and possibly do more for himself.

Cecilia's thoughtj

13 of placement with another Indian family were not too good.

She

14 felt Jeremiah had established ties and to remove him would cause him|
15 more harm.
16

29.

During the months of 1983/ the social working office

17 tried to contact various experts to testify as to the stability of
18 the Saunders family.
19

testify.

The first doctor contacted did not want to

Thereafter/ contact was made with Dr. Thomas and Dr.

20 Muller on providing an evaulation of the Saunders family.

Both

21 doctors were reluctant to testify in court of the stability of the
22 Saunders family.

They felt that it would be unfair to testify on

23 behalf of the family and not be able to express what might develop
24 later as a result of Cecilia's family history.
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Both doctors indicatje

1 they did not want to testify in court.
CONCLUSION

2
3

As stated initially/ it should be noted that there are a great

4 many records which are still not in the Court's file.

There are

5 large gaps in time when there are no social worker notes and there
6 are references to reports that are not in the file.

Accordingly/

7 petitioners are simply submitting a summary of the documents that
8 have now been submitted and certainly not attesting at to their
9 completeness or their similarity to the original documents previous
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10 submitted to the Court.
11
12

?™

13

o.
W Ui o. 0> «j
z^
< V)

day of October, 1984.
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, FOR:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioners
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing SUMMARY OF TRIBAL RECORDS to

16
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan and Mr. Craig Dorsay, Attorneys for the Navajo

17
Nation, at Provo, Utah this 22nd day of October, 1984.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

ttffl

STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION
SUMMARY OF PRIOR TESTIMONY
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY,
DOB: 5/14/77
A person under eighteen years
of age.

Probate No. 19981

COME NOW the petitioners and give the following summary of the
testimony offered by the witnesses in prior hearings in this case.
All references are to the transcript page numbers.
CECILIA DICK SAUNDERS TESTIMONY
1.

Cecilia testified that she was in foster placement in Utah

from the third grade to the eleventh grade (p. 17/ lines 14-23).
2.

Cecilia testified that the natural father of Jeremiah was

Ernest Yazzie/ Jr. and that the child was born May 14/ 1977 in
Gallop, New Mexico (p. 18/ lines 17-22).
3.

Cecilia testified that the initial care of the child was

given by her mother/ Bessie Begay (p. 19/ lines 4-8). Cecilia did
testify that she had access to the child up to the time he was six
years of age (p. 19/ lines 11-14).
4.

Cecilia testified that during the initial six months/ she

lived with her mother/ Bessie Begay and her step-father/ Jack Begay
(p. 19/ line 15 to p. 20/ line 5 ) . After the six month period,
Cecilia started seeing Arthur Saunders and did not live with her
mother and stayed either at Arthurfs house or at her house (p. 20/
lines 2-14).
5.

Cecilia testified that she married Arthur Saunders in

July of 1978 but could not remeber the date (p. 20/ lines 18-19).
6.

Cecilia testified that the primary care of Jeremiah after

the initial six month period was with her mother/ Bessie Begay,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
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(p. 20/ lines 20-23).
Additionally,
that Bessie Begay and Jack

Begay had a drinking problem (p. 20/ line 24 through p. 21/ line 2 ) .
7.

Cecilia testified that at the time physical custody of the

child was transferred to the grandmother/ the step-father/ Arthur
Saunders was apparently abusing Jeremiah.

Arthur didn't like the

child because he wasn't his son (p. 20/ lines 3-23).

In addition/

Arthur stated that he was not going to bother with the child and
would not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the child
the normal love that a father would give a child (p. 22/ line 23
through p. 23/ line 9 ) .
8.

Cecilia testified there were times when the social workers

found the child left unattended because Bessie was drunk (p. 23/
lines 21-25).

Cecilia testified that when Bessie would drink she

O'V

would go an alcoholic binge for a week (p. 23/ lines 7-9). Cecilia
*\

testified that Jack Begay/ her step-father/ had the same drinking
problem and accordingly never assumed any care of the child (p. 24/
lines 10-15).
9.

The only contact Cecilia had with the child from the time

Jeremiah was six months of age on is when the child would be brought
over for approximately two to three days at Arthur's house every
two or three weeks (p. 25/ lines 4-8 and p. 26/ lines 22-25).
10.

Two of Cecilia's six sisters,

Rosita and Polly complained

of the care that Jeremiah was receiving (p. 28/ lines 2-6 and p. 20/
lines 14-19).
11.

Polly reported to Cecilia that she had found the child

with Jack Begay who was drunk and that Jeremiah hadn't eaten.

Polly

was unsure as to the number of days that Jeremiah had not eaten
(p. 30/ lines 13-14).

Cecilia testified that Polly got her consent

to take the child (p. 42/ lines 11-12).

In addition/ Bessie/ the

grandmother knew what had happened to the child (p. 42/ lines 19-20).
12.

Cecilia testified unequivocably that she did not object to
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the child being taken to Utah and that she thought it was in the

best interest'of the child to go to Utah (p. 31/ lines 19-23).

In

addition/ Cecilia told Polly adoption was alright inasmuch as was a
subject they had talked about for along period of time (p. 32/
lines 13-20) .
13.

Cecilia understood the consent to adoption when she signed

it (p. 32/ line 20-25 through p. 33/ line 9 ) . Cecilia testified
two years after the child was taken to Utah/ she was contacted by
the Tribe who said that Jeremiah could not be adopted out of state
(p. 35/ lines 3-4). Cecilia was asked if she really wanted to give.
Jeremiah up for adoption and she answered that question by saying
/

\K

yes (p.35/ lines 8-11).
14.

Finally/ Cecilia said there was only one sister who would

take the child and that was Minie and she was determined not to be
fit (p. 45/ line 20 through p. 46/ line 2 ) .
POLLY DICK TESTIMONY
1.

Polly testifed that the child was passed to different

people consisting of sisters/ her mom/ etc. (p. 57/ lines 19-20).
2.

Polly testified that when she picked Jeremiah up the child

had a T-shirt and underwear and that was all (p. 58/ lines 8-17).
At the time she picked up the child/ Jack Begay/ the step-father told
Polly that nobody takes care of the kid and to take them away
(p. 58/ lines 18-20).
3.

Polly indicated that no one in the family ever resisted the

adoption (p. 59/ line 25).
4.

Polly testified that Cecilia had told her that when the

Tribe contacted her to get Jeremiah back that they told Jeremiah was
going to be back on the reservation or they would put her in jail
(p. 60/ line 23 through p. 20 through p. 61/ line 3 ) .
DAN CARTER TESTIMONY
1.

Dan Carter testified that when the child came to Utah/ he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had a viral skin infection
poor
dental care (p. 71/ lines 7-14).

that he would cover his head when you would raise your hand and tnat
he had a habit of begging for money (p. 72/ lines 9-16)•

Finally/

Dan testified the child appeared to be very insecure (p. 73/ lines
3-13).
SOCIAL WORKERS TESTIMONY
1.

Most of the testimony of the'social workers is set out in

the summary of the social worker file attached hereto.

Other than

that/ their testimony has been previously submitted to the court in
the form of petitioners1 motion for sanctions.

In addition to that*

testimony/ Lauren Bernally/ testified that they could not have
placed Jeremiah in the homes of Arlene/ Minnie/ and Rosita who were
Cecilia's sisiters after doing the homestudy evaluations because
they were not felt to be proper custodians (p. 128/ lines 1-4).
Although Lauren testified there were assessments of the family done/
those assessments did not appear in any of the files presented to
the Court (p. 133/ lines 14-18).

Finally/ Lauren Bernally did not

have any excuse for the termination of the note on 11-17-82 (p. 145/
lines 23-25).
DATED this

day of October/ 1984.

RICHARD B. JOHNSON/ FOR:
HOWARD/ LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioners
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing SUMMARY OF PRIOR TESTIMONY
to Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan and Mr. Craig Dorsay# at Provo/ Utah/ dated
this 22nd day of October, 1984.
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Jtoled $, cHov&, <Pk?b.
Diplomate in Clinical Psychology
American Board of Professional Psychology
Diplomate in Forensic Psychology
American Board of Forensic Psychology

October 17, 1984
Richard B. Johnson, Esquire
Howard, Lewis and Petersen
120 East 300 North Street
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Re: Dan and Patricia Carter v. Navajo Tribal Council in reference to
Jeremiah Halloway, aka Michael Chad Carter
Dear Mr. Johnson:
In response to your referral, I have examined Jeremiah Halloway, and Dan
and Patricia Carter in reference to the dispute between the Carters and
the Navajo Indian Council over the right for the Carters to have custody of
Jeremiah. As you know, Jeremiah is called by the Carters, Michael Chad
Carter. Indeed, he does not know his name, Jeremiah. Therefore, I will
refer to him in this report as Michael. In conducting this examinatiion, I
interviewed both Mr. and Mrs. Carter, and I administered to them the
Bipolar Psychological Inventory, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory,
both of which are objective personality tests, and the Shipley Institute of
Living Scale, which is an intelligence test. I gave Michael the Rorschach
Ink Blot Test, the ChildrenTs Apperception Test, and the Bender Gestalt
Perceptual Motor Test. It is my understanding that I will have the
opportunity to review the test protocols from Dr. Samual Roll who examined
Michael for the Navajo Tribal Council. You provided me a copy of his
report, and I will refer to this report later.
I asked a doctoral graduate student, Emily Fallis, to administer to Michael
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Revised Edition, and I asked
another graduate student, Lura Tibbitts-Kleber, who is doing her doctoral
research on parental attachment under my direction, to provide me a
summary of the affect of removing a child from his "psychological parents."
I will attach a copy of her summary to this report. In addition, I talked to
the three school teachers that Michael has had, a Linda Coray, who was his
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Dan and Patricia Carter v. Navajo Tribal Council
In Reference to Jeremiah Halloway
October 17, 1984
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kindergarten teacher during the school year, 1982-83, to Patricia Farrer,
who was Michael's first grade teacher during the school year 1983-84, and
to Virginia Hansen, who is Michael's present second grade teacher. I also
talked to Mrs. Ann Carter, the mother of Dan Carter, to Mr. Albert
Hawkins, the father of Patricia Carter.
I talked to Mrs. Marian Seamons, a person who lives in Orem, Utah, and
who with her husband, have had a number of Indian children live in their
homes, to Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Carter, (no relationship to Dan and Patricia)
who have also had a number of Indian children living in their home. I also
asked Mr. Paul Buckingham, who is a social worker, and who has worked
with Indian children placements to examine the family. I will attach his
report.
As you know, I asked that you try to arrange for me to interview Cecelia
Ann Dick Sanders, Michael's biological mother, but apparently this could not
be arranged. I also would have liked to have talked to Michael's maternal
aunt, Polly, but the Carters have been unable to provide me with a
telephone number for her. At this point, I have spent in excess of twelve
hours in interviewing these people, and testing them as indicated above, and
in scoring the tests and synthesizing the material, and dictating the report.
I told all the people I interviewed that I had been retained by you, and you
in turn, are working for the Carters. I will, first, present the material that
I have gathered, and then, I will offer some opinions and recommendations
in this case.
ISSUE:
It is my understanding that the court will be considering only one question
which is raised by the Indian Child Welfare Act, which in paragraph F,
states:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by
evidence beyond a resonable doubt, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
As I read Dr. Roll's report, it seems to me that the issue revolves around
the possible damage that will be done to Michael, should he be taken from
the Carter home, versus (to quote from Dr. Roll's report) "if Jeremiah stays
with the Carters, he will likely to continue to try to be more and more
white by hating Indians. When he becomes an adolescent, he will hate
himself. Acting out behavior, self destructive behavior are very strong
liklihoods."
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OPINION.
It is my opinion if lat the probability of ^mo-ionai l«mage taking place
which would result from removing Michael from the Carter home, far
outweighs the potential conflict as to Michael not having a clear identity
of himself as an Indian, and yet, also knowing that he is not Caucasian. It
is my belief that the probability of emotional damage is at a very high level
of certainty- -beyond a reasonable doubt. I will amplify this more in the
Opinions and Recommendations Section,
DATA AND REASONING:
DAN LEWIS CAR; FER •
358 East 100 North
Spanish Fork, Utah, 84860
Telephone: 798-9268
Date of Birth: December 22, 1951
Date of Interview: October 5, 1984 •'
Dan Carter is a 32 year old, Caucasian male who is 5 feet, 8 inches in
height, and weighs 175 pounds He has blonde hair and blue eyes. He
presents himself in a very straight forward a nd direct, and yet,
non-confrontive and non-abrasive manner,
Dai i conies from a family that consists of his father, Earl carter, who is
now 57 years of age, and is a plumber. With the exception of hypertension,
Mr. Carter is said to be in good health. DanTs mother, Ann Carter, is 53
years of age, and is in good health. Dan is the oldest child in the family.
There was a older sister that died when Dan was six. Dan has a brother who
is 30 years of age, and is married, and is in computer programming, and he
and his wife are the parents of two children. Kathy is 26 years of age,
married, and she her husband have two children, Christine is 22 years of
age. Her husband is in computer programming at the Brigham Young
University. They do not have any children. The two youngest children in the
family are Matthew, 13 years of age, and Karen, 7 years of age,
Dan said he had a very good relationship with his parents. There were many
family projects. They had a cabin at Strawberry Reservoir, and spent much
time in the outdoors,
Dan graduated from, Provo High School .n I;J-'IL He thrn, went to Brigham
Young University for a semester, and then, fille- a mission in Austria, for
the then, two years period of time. He received an honorable release from
his mission. He then, attended Brigham Young University for another
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semester and one-half, and then, went to the Utah Technical College for
two quarters so he could play baseball . Since that time, he has been
working with his father and currently is a journeyman plumber.
Dan married in 1975 to Pat Hawkins and they have had no biologic children
from this marriage. Thus, Michael is the only child in the home.
Dan said he and Pat have a good relationship with each other. They are
active in the L.D.S. Church. Dan is in the elderTs quorum presidency.
Neither of them use street drugs or alcohol, nor do they smoke. Dan said
the only legal problems that he has had was when he was a youngster, he
was picked up for setting off firecrackers and he has had a few traffic
tickets as an adult. The couple are buying their home in Spanish Fork.
Dan said he continues to enjoy the outdoors. He and Pat take Michael
fishing a good deal, and as Michael gets a little older, he will go hunting
with Dan.
Dan indicated that he had no mental illnesses in his family. He said his
mother, when she was Relief Society president, seemed to develop a anxiety
reaction briefly and was hospitalized for this. There were no evidences of
alcohol abuse in the immediate or extended family.
Dan said he sleeps well at night. He is usually in bed by 10:30 at night. He
is asleep within 10 minutes. He sleeps until the alarm goes off at 7:00 in
the morning. He said he has a very good appetite. He said his moods are
very stable. He seldom finds himself depressed, although, he is quite
concerned about the possibility of losing Michael.
The Carters have had Michael since the latter part of March in 1980. Dan
told me how a friend of theirs had been contacted by Aunt Polly and this
person referred Aunt Polly to them. They were asked if they would like to
adopt Michael. They received Michael when he was about two years and ten
months of age. Michael has lived with them continuously. Dan indicated that
the biological mother, Cecelia Sanders, has never visited Michael. He said
in one court hearing (there have been two prior hearings) the mother
claimed that she was not allowed to visit him but he said this is not true.
They have never prohibited the mother from visiting Michael. He told me
that Michael lived primarily with the maternal grandmother, Bessie Begay,
and this is what you told me.
You indicated in your letter that there was considerable evidence that
Grandmother Begay was alcoholic, and that the child was often left
unattended. Further, you indicaated that the mother, Cecelia Dick Sanders,
"had little or no interest in him during that period of time."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dan and Patricia Carter v. Navajo Tribal Council
In Reference to Jeremiah Halloway
October 17, 1984
Page 5
Dan Carter said that they have never had any problems with Michael, that
he is average to above average in school; he reads well, and he is good in
arithmetic. He said Michael enjoys the church activities (with the exception
that he fidgets in sacrament meeting) and he has a number of friends who
play with him. Dan said he has never been teased because he is an Indian.
Dan told me that, at one point, Cecelia told Judge Sam that Michael's
biologic father was Anglo but in court, said the father was Indian. He also
told me that after one of the court hearings, that the mother is reported to
have said that she would prefer that Michael stay with the Carters.
Dan told me that both the kindegarten teacher and the first grade teacher
noticed that Michael became withdrawn and had a worried look when he
knew that the court hearings were coming up. At the time of the second
court hearing, Dan told me that Michael had nightmares and indicated that
in his dreams, people and monkeys were coming to take him away.
Apparently, Michael was examined in your office by Dr. Roll. The report
indicates it was on January 14, 1983 but according to Dan and Pat, it was
on December 10, 1983. Dan indicated that Dr. Robert Crist saw Michael on
December 8, 1983, and advised the Carters not to tell Michael about these
court hearings. Finally, Dan indicated to me that he grew up with a Navajo
Indian, Ralph Wilson. Apparently, Ralph was in Dan's neighborhood from the
time he was in the fifth grade until he was in his last year of high school.
On the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Dan obtained a vocabulary I.Q. of
114, an abstraction I.Q. of 140, with a fullscale I.Q. of 126. Dan's lowered
(though above average) vocabulary score is the result of Dan!s not reading
very much when he was in school. It is obvious, though, that Dan is a very
bright person, and now, he is trying to build his vocabulary. On the Bipolar
Psychological Inventory, Dan, like so many parents that are involved in
custody disputes, had a high score on the Lie scale. The other scores were
all in the normal range. He scored as being a very open individual, one who
was very optimistic, with good self-esteem, self-sufficiency, achieved
oriented, gregarious, as a person who enjoyed family harmony, as a person
who was socially conforming, with a good deal of self-control, and kindness,
and emphathy. On the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, again, there was an
effort made by Dan to put himself in as good of a light as possible, and all
the scores were in the normal range. Once again, he showed himself to be a
very gregarious and social individual.
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PATRICIA HAWKINS CARTER:
856 East 100 North
Spanish Fork, Utah, 84660
Telephone: 798-9268
Date of Birth: September 24, 1953
Date of Interview: October 5, 1984
Patricia Carter, who prefers to be called Pat, is a 31 year old, Caucasian
female, who stands five feet, one and one-half inches in height, and weighs
175 pounds. She has blonde hair and hazel eyes. Pat comes from a family
that consists of her father who is 58 or 59 years of age, and who runs a
fast food restaurant. She said her father is in good health. Her mother,
Helen Hawkins, is one or two years younger than Mr. Hawkins and is also in
good health. The oldest child of this family is Kathy. She is 36 years of
age. She is married and is the mother of three children. Her husband
teaches at a University in California. Pam is next. She is 34 years of age.
She is married and her husband works at the Utah State Prison. This couple
have five children. Next is Ryan. He is 33 years of age. He and his wife
have four children. He works at a convenience gas station and store.
Finally, Pat is the youngest child in the family. She described herself as
being a tomboy while she was growing up. She said she and Ryanwere very
good friends. She said that in school, she did well on those things she was
interested in, but frequently, she was not interested in school. She said she
graduated from Provo High School in 1971, and then, went to the Technical
College where she did well. She continued there for one term. She started
dating Dan in 1975. They became engaged in June of 1975 and they were
married September 23, 1975.
Pat has had a number of female problems. She had a tubal pregnancy, and
because of this, she only has a small piece of ovary left. She has never
been able to get pregnant. The couple tried to investigate invitro
fertilization but this has not been successful. Pat described herself as being
in good health. She said there were no mental illnesses in her immediate or
extended family. She said there was no alcohol or street drug abuse in her
family, and she described hers and Danfs activity in church. She indicated
that she thought she and Dan had a very good marriage. She said Dan had a
temper. She said she sleeps very well at night. She goes to sleep
immediately, and she has a good appetite. She said, like her husband, her
moods seldom fluctuate.
She told me they received Michael on March 23, 1980 and she said when he
came to them, he did not speak english. He almost immediately became
adjusted well in the family. She said initially, he knew how to beg moeny
from people who came to her parents restaurant, and he also tried to
erotically, kiss her and he would get erections when he did this.
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Pat described Michaelfs mother, Cecelia, as being a very nice person. She
said Cecelia has said many times that she wants Michael to be happy. She
also described MichaelTs worries and nightmares at the times of the first
and second court hearing and told me many of the same things that her
husband, Dan, told me. She said she is worried as to what would happen if
Michael were to go back to the reservation, that the biological mother is
not active in church and Cecelia ! s current husband, "hates Mormons." She
also told me that, at one point, Cecelia said that Michael's father was
Anglo but "is now saying Michael's father is a fullblooded Navajo.
She told me Michael is large for his age; that he enjoys physical contact
with people, and she described how well the children both at school and in
church have accepted him. She described him as being "tougher than other
kids."
On the Bipolar Psychological Inventory, Pat scored high on the Lie scale.
(Once again, this is not at all unusual for people in custody disputes to
have a high score on this.) She showed herself to be a very dependent
individual, as an individual who did not have a high degree of motivation,
and as an individual who, when she was a child, felt that there was a fair
amount of family discord. In contrast, she scored as having a good deal of
psychic comfort, as being optimistic, as being socially conforming, and
showing good self-control* On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory, she also tried to put herself in a good light, and all other scores
were in the normal range. On the Shipley Institute of Living Scale,' she
received a vocabulary I.Q. of 120, an abstraction LQ. of 120, and a
fullscale LQ. of 120.
MICHAEL CHAD CARTER:
Date of Birth: May 14, 1977
Date of Interview: October 5, 1984
Michael Chad Carter is seven years and five months of age. When I saw
him, he was in the 92nd percentile in weight, and the 87th percentile in
height. Michael has dark brown hair, and brown eyes. He quickly adjusted
himself to the interview and was outgoing and friendly. He told me of the
friends he had, and told me how much he liked school, and how much he
liked church. He said he has a bedroom of his own and that he and his
father (Mr. Carter) played catch with football and baseball. They go fishing
a lot and Michael said he was very happy with his parents. Michael told me
that he had no memories of having lived with anybody else but the Carters,
and he made it very clear to me that he wanted to stay with them. He told
me about a cat that he had, a cat that his parents gave him. He talked
about going to movies with his parents, and he talked about having five
grandparents. These refer to the four anglo grandparents (Mr. and Mrs.
Hawkins and Mr. and Mrs. Carter, and then, the father of Mr. Carter).
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Michael indicated that when he grows up, he would probably marry a white
girl and he said he wanted to do things like his dad (Mr. Carter) did.
As I indicated, Emily Fallis, one of my doctoral students, gave Michael the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for children, Revised Edition. On this, he
obtained a verbal I.Q. of 107, an non-verbal or performance I.Q. of 100, and
a fullscale I.Q. of 103. Ms. Fallis indicated that Michael was a very open
and personable child. She indicated that he was quick to admit when he
didnTt know an answer, and would sometimes ask her for the correct
answer. She described him as having a mature and flexible manner as
opposed to a dependent manner, and said that he was talkative but was
attentive to the tasks at hand. It is interesting to note that on the subtests
that Michael's general fund of information was above average, as was his
ability to abstract, as was his vocabulary. It was also noted that his writing
and arithmetic ability were at the average to above average range. As I
indicated, I gave Michael the ChildrenTs Apperception Test. On this test, he
showed the usual boy (masculine) type of stories. The Rorschach indicated a
very good reality testing on Michael's part. His identity formation has
formed quicker than children his age and there is no evidence of any
emotional or psychological disturbance. The computer printout indicates the
following:
1. The personality style is well entrenched and stable currently
due to the presence of a preponderance of organized
psychological activity over more disruptive and irritating
activity.
2. Mature and organized controls
controlled expression of these needs.

are

adequate

to

the

3. Emotional discharges will not be well modulated. (However)
sufficient controls exist that the client may be seen simply as
very colorful or creative.
4. There is a clear potential for impulsivity, inappropriate
behavior, and or affective excesses.
5. There is an average degree of perceptual accuracy or reality
testing, both at times when emotions and thoughts are allowed
free expression and when these activties are kept under
stricter control.
6. The client's aspirations appear comensurate with his or her
abilities.
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7. The client is quite aware of other people and may even be
overly concerned about them."
LINDA CORAY:
Interview: October 6, 1984
Telephone: 798-2463
Linda Coray, Michael's kindegarten teacher, said that Michael was very
quiet when he first came to school, but in late October and November, they
had a unit on Indians at Thanksgiving, and he was the Indian in the
program,"and he blossomed from that experience." She said he did very well
in school. While he wasn't the fastest student, he was a very good student
in school. She said she thought Mr. and Mrs. Carter may have had too high
of expectations at first, but the parents kept in close contact with the
school, and they quickly adjusted their expectations in keeping with
suggestions from Mrs. Coray. She said Michael frequently would bring things
such as animal skins that Mr. Carter had tanned to school, and she
commented that both parents came to every parent-teacher meeting that
was held. She said it was uncommon for both parents of children in her
class to always come to these meetings. She commented that Michael
became more withdrawn when the (first) court hearing was imminent. She
commented that he had never talked about things that happened when he
was living with his "Indian parents" and when he was on the reservation.
She said that he soon learned to speak as well as the other children. She
said she lives in the neighborhood where the Carters live, and that Michael
has fit in very well at church. She said he tries diligently to please other
people and he is well accepted by other people.
PAULA FARRER:
Telephone: 377-1313
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984
Ms. Farrer was Michael's first grade teacher. She had Michael for six hours
each day during the school year. She said he was never a behavior problem,
that he was very talkative, and that he was a physical child. She said he
excelled in reading and math. He was well accepted by the other children.
She said he was upset during the court hearing and he seemed quite
nervous. She said he told her once, "I'm going to see a man to see if I can
stay at home with my Mom and Dad." She said she thought he had a very
good relationship with both parents. She said the father (Mr. Carter) did
many things with him in sports and outdoor activities. She said the mother
would come to school as a mother's helper, and she could see that Michael
and Pat got along well with each other. She said he scored well on the
standardized achievement tests, especially, in reading comprehension and
science. Finally, she said he was as well adjusted as any of the other
children and that "he never mentioned anybody but the Carters as being

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dan and Patricia Carter v. Navajo Tribal Council
In Reference to Jeremiah Halloway
October 17, 1984
Page 10
parents."
VIRGINIA HANSEN:
Telephone: 798-3421
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984
Ms. Hansen told me that Mike was doing very well in the second grade. He
has a very good self concept. He has many friends. She said he did well in
reading and math, that he was not a discipline problem. She described him
as being a very happy child, and he was in the best reading group in her
class. She said she was impressed with the Carters as parents because they
kept up on his reading assignments, and that it was obvious that they are
helping him with his schoolwork. She said Mike has talked about the family
vacations and doing things both with his parents and with his grandparents
and his cousins.
ANN CARTER:
280 West 1730 North
Provo, Utah, 84604
Telephone: 373-3197
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984
Mrs. Carter is Danfs mother. She described Dan as being a very good
person, both as a child and as a father and husband. She said Dan had
worked with his father for many years and enjoyed working with his father.
She said she thought that Pat and Dan got along with each other very well
and that they were surprisingly compatible, especially, considering the fact
that Pat had never been involved in sports and outdoors. "Now, she does
everything with Dan." She said Dan, Pat, and Michael are alwyays doing
things as a family. She said they do so much as a family that they seldom
ask her to babysit Michael. She told me about when Dan was growing up
that the neighbors had Indian children. She specifically mentioned Ralph
Wilson and the fact that Dan associated with Ralph as one of his best
friends. She told me that Dan was broken hearted when the social worker
said they were going to take Mike back to the reservation. She is happy
that Dan and Pat are fighting "to keep Mike with them."
She described Mike as being surprisingly alert and inquisitive, and said that
he asked many questions.
ALBERT HAWKINS:
Telephone: 377-2495
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984
Mr. Hawkins is Pat ! s father. He described Pat and Dan as being very
devoted to Mike. He said that Pat and Dan had an excellent relationship
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with each other and that Mike is much better behaved and minds better
than some of their other grandchildren. He said he thinks the best interests
of Mike would be met by Mike continuuing to live with Pat and Dan. He
concluded by saying that Michael gets along very well with his cousins
"especially, the boys his size."
MRS. MARIAN SEAMONS:
Telephone: 225-1916
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984
Mrs. Seamons and her husband have had number of Indian children live with
them during the schoolyear. Especially, a Ralph Wilson, who was with them
from the time when he was in the fifth grade to the time he was in his last
year of high school. She said that Ralph and Dan were very good friends
and she thought that they got along well with each other and that Dan was
appreciative and accepting of Ralph. She said she had seen Dan and Pat and
Michael together. She described xMichael as being well adjusted and happy
and said Michael is very well cared for. She said if she had a child that
needed to have parents, she would choose Pat and Dan as the parents for
the child.
MR. AND MRS. MELVIN CARTER:
Telephone: 798-6296
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984
Mr. and Mrs. Carter have also had a number of Indian children in their
home. They currently have a Navajo girl. They know the Carters quite well.
She said Pat and Dan are good parents to Mike. They allow him freedom to
have friends and yet, they have expectations for him and they are good
disciplinarians for him.
MATERIAL FROM DR. ROLLTS REPORT:
It is interesting to read Dr. RolTs report on Michael. He describes Michael
as having a well developed capacity to relate to other people and he
indicated:
Jeremiah is very closely and warmly bonded and attached to
the Carters. It is clear that he sees them as faithful and
powerful sources of stimulation, confidence, and security. He
also looks to them for positive, productive discipline. His love
and bonding to them very strongly speaks to the value that the
relationship with Carters has for him. It is very difficult for
Jeremiah to make a break with the Carters and will cause
considerable pain and period of painful mourning. It is clear
that Jeremiah will not be able to go through this period
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successfully without close supervision and professional help.
On the other side, Dr. Roll indicates that Jeremiah is suffering from a mild
to moderate depression. (I did not see this when I examined him.) He
indicated that:
He sees Indians as bad, ugly, and frightened. He sees his Indian
mother, particular, as bad, ugly, and weak, dumb, and dishonest.
He sometimes refers to characters in his fantasies as ugly,
brown Indians and generally, represents Indians as being
destructive or damaged. (Further, he indicates that Jeremiah)
reports he is an Indian now but when he grows up, he will be a
white man, which he explains is better because they are
stronger. All Indians are weak, canTt chop wood and white men
can. He also said his baby will be white. Further, he explains
the Indian part of him will come out in the baby by the baby
playing with Indians. This extreme confusion about his own
racial identity, a very serious and negative view of Indians, and
about his own specific origins are striking and pathological."
(Dr. Roll concludes), it will be safer in the long run if after a
period of visitation and preparation, Jeremiah be returned to
the Navajo family. The period of preparation will take, at least,
a year and will require supervised visitation of increasing
lengths and frequency. During this time, the families involved
and Jeremiah are going to need professional assistance in the
form of supportive social work and family therapy. In sum,
there is no way to avoid hurting Jeremiah. My recommendation
that in the long run, the least pain to Jeremiah will result by
returning him to his Navajo family. Whether this is done or not,
he and those caring for him are going to have to take extensive
steps in order to keep an evitably painful process from
becoming even more painful."
LIBRARY SEARCH BY LURA TIBBITTS-KLEBER:
As indicated, I have attached a library search to this report and will not
repeat the contents of this in this report. I will only note that the
literature as known by Mrs. Tibbitts—Kleber, who is doing her doctoral
research on parental and child attachment disorders clearly points to family
and parental disruption as being much more serious than racial confusion.
REPORT FROM PAUL BUCKINGHAM:
As I indicated, I asked Mr. Paul Buckingham to examine the Carters and
Michael. Mr. Buckingham has worked for a number of years in placing
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Indian children and adolescents in foster homes. Mr. BuckinghamTs report,
based on his first visit (and one or two more visits have been scheduled) is
attached and indicates that Michael and Mr. and Mrs. Carter are firmly
bonded to each other. To separate this bonding is precarious at best. Mr.
Buckingham is of the opinion that should Michael be allowed to stay with
the Carters, he will undoubtedly become a bicultural person. Mr.
Buckingham does not see this as detrimental to Michaelfs well being
OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no memory of his life for, two
years and ten months on the reservation.
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home that he is now in and sees Mr. and
Mrs. Carter as his parents. In my opinion, the Carters are his psychological
parents.
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be emotionally damaged by taking him
out of the home. The nearly five years that he has spent with the Carters,
especially, when considering the early age that he came with them, clearly
speaks to the importance of his continuuing to live with them.
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that effort should be made to inculcate in Michael
an appreciation for his heritage, and I see no reason why contact could not
be effected between Cecelia Sanders and Michael.
5. I could not find any evidence that Michael was depressed. If he was
depressed when Dr. Roll saw him, it is likely that this was a reaction to his
fears that he would be taken away from the Carters. He told his school
teacher Paula Farrer that he was going to see a man to determine if he
could keep living with the Carters.
If I may be of any futher help in this matter, please feel free to contact
me.
Sincerely yours

^ ^ . J i ^ ^ Robert J. Howell, Ph.D.
1190 North Ninth East #285
Provo, Utah 84604
RJH:mr
Attachments
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Tnf*rv-jPW with Michael Chad Clark.
JL • * Clark, and Patricia Clark
October 10, 1984

On October 10, 1984, I had the opportunity to observe and interview .Mike
Carter in the presence of his parents, Dan and Pat
The interview lasted
approximately forty-five minutes. I observed Mike to be relaxed and open in
his conversation and answers. During the interview, he stood for a litle while
but mostly leaned, layed and sat on his father's lap. His overall demeanor was
relaxed and comfortable with the setting, and throughout the interview he
maintained a physical attachment with his father. His answers were assured
and discriptive. His communication, both verbal and nonverbal, demonstrated a
close bond between himself and his parents. We discussed the expression of
emotion, both positive and negative., (i.e., he is affectionate and says he loves
his parents almost daily, he glares and at times -yells when he is very unhappy,,
angry, or very disappointed). It is evident that Mike is bonded to the Carters.
We discussed what is planned as far as the maintainance of heritage and
Navajo culture in Mike's life. The parents plan to utilize relatives and the
resources at RYU to instill pride in his ethnicity and recover traditions of his
people. Trips to the reservation, the parents having more intense study of the
Navajo culture, and the re-learning of the language, are all future goals of the
parents to have their son maintain his heritage while learning to function well
in the dominant white man's society.
It would appear that the intent of the paresis r :osui"^ :.> . v &ujut the child
to bi-culturality rather than to make him white or assimilated into a
traditional Wasatch white mormon youth. Presently his relationship with his
parents appears to be excellent and very close. Disruption of this bond in the
name of ethnic heritage would probably cause retardation of self-worth,
identity,, and ability to cope and problem solve in the future
Respectfully,
"" <&*< > A
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ^\\-,

' •' £/*

DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION
NAVAJO NATION; NAVAJO NATION, as
parens patriae for JEREMIAH
HALLOWAY, CECELIA SAUNDERS,
BESSIE BEGAY,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
IN FURTHERANCE OF
ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY,
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE
OF UTAH; HONORABLE DAVID SAM;
DAN and PATRICIA CARTER,

Civil No. C35-317G

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for hearing on August 29,
1985, on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Motion for
Summary Judgment of defendants District Court for Utah County,
Fourth Judicial District, State of Utah, and Honorable David Sam;
and the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment of defendants Dan and Patricia Carter.

Craig J. Dorsay

of the Navajo Nation Department of Justice appeared on behalf of
the plaintiffs, Stephen J. Sorenson of the Utah Attorney
General's office appeared on behalf of defendants District Court
for Utah County, Fourth Judicial District, State of Utah and
Honorable David Sam, and Richard B. Johnson of Howard, Lev/is &
Sorenson appeared on behalf of defendants Dan and Patricia
Carter.

Having reviewed extensive memoranda of law and exhibits

which were Digitized
filedby the
with
Court,
having
heard
Howard the
W. Hunter
Law Library,and
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU. extensive oral
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

arguments of all counsel, the Court granted the defendants1
Motions for Summary Judgment and denied the plaintiffs1 Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Having further reviewed all matters and

being fully advised, the Court now sets forth its Memorandum
Decision as was contemplated at the time the oral orders were
rendered.

This Memorandum Decision is incorporated into the

orders made on August 29, 1985.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arose out of an adoption proceeding in the
District Court for Utah County, Fourth Judicial District, State
of Utah.

Jeremiah Halloway, the subject of the proceeding, was

born on May 14, 1977, to plaintiff, Cecilia Saunders, a fullblooded Navajo, a member of the Navajo Tribe and a domiciliary of
the Navajo Reservation.

Jeremiah lived the first six months of

his life with his mother, after which he was under the care of
his maternal grandmother, Bessie Begay.

In March of 1930, a

maternal aunt removed Jeremiah from the reservation with the oral
consent of the mother and took him to Utah for adoptive placement
with defendants Dan and Patricia Carter.

In May of 1980, the

natural mother appeared in the District Court for Utah County and
executed a Consent to Adoption after which defendants Dan and
Patricia Carter then filed a petition for adoption.

Defendant

Judge David Sam ordered counsel for defendants Dan and Patricia
Carter to give notice seeking the consent of the Navajo Tribe
before proceeding with the adoption, and notification was given
approximately five months later to plaintiff Navajo Nation.

Some

two years after
the
petition
for J.adoption
in May of
Digitized by the
Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
Reuben Clark Lawwas
School,filed,
BYU.
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1982, the Navajo Nation appeared in the lav/suit as intervenor and
filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding and transfer
jurisdiction to the tribe on the basis of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1973 (ICWA), Pub. L. No. 95-608 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).

After a hearing on the matter, on July

14, 1982, defendant Judge David Sam awarded temporary custody to
Dan and Patricia Carter, and ruled that the domicile of the child
was that of the adoptive parents, that good cause existed for the
State Court to retain jurisdiction, and that the requirements of
the ICWA had been satisfied.

The State Court gave the parties

additional opportunity to present further evidence on the
domicile issue, and after receiving that evidence, entered an
order dated October 6, 1983, reaffirming its finding that the
child's domicile was that of the adoptive parents and that good
cause existed under the ICWA for the State Court to retain
jurisdiction.

The Court also ruled that there had been an

abandonment of the child.
On October 12, 1984, the District Court of the Navajo
Nation for Window Rock found that, pursuant to Navajo common law
and statute, the domicile of Jeremiah had at all times remained
within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation and that the
Navajo Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction under tribal statutes,
common law and the ICWA to determine the custody of Jeremiah
Halloway.

Just prior to the date set for trial

termination of

the parental rights, the Navajo Nation filed a Motion for Full
Faith and Credit and to Dismiss in the state court proceedings,
based upon the ruling of the Navajo District Court that it had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings and that the
Fourth District Court was without jurisdiction.

At the beginning

of the trial on October 22, 1984, the State Court denied the
motion as untimely, and went ahead with the trial on the
termination of parental rights.

On January 28, 1985, defendant

Judge David Sam entered his decision, finding:
(1) That the evidence (including expert
testimony) established beyond a reasonable
doubt that to return Jeremiah to his Indian
custodians would result in serious emotional
or physical damage to him;
(2) That active efforts have been undertaken
to attempt the rehabilitation of the Indian
family and have failed; and
(3) That the biological mother knowingly and
voluntarily abandoned the child as defined in
Utah Code Annotated 78-3a-48(1).
The State Court therefore granted the petition for adoption, and
on February 28, 1985, the Navajo Nation filed a Notice of Appeal
of Judge David Sam's decision to the Utah Supreme Court.

That

appeal presently is pending and being pursued by all parties.

On

March 15, 1985, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah.
The action before this Court contains fifteen separate
claims for relief based on alleged violation by the defendants of
the ICWA and the United States Constitution.

Six claims seek

recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of civil
rights; eight claims seek declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2201, alleging that the exercise of state jurisdiction was void;
and one pendent claim alleges that the placement of Jeremiah with
the adoptive parents violated the Interstate Compact on Placement
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of Children, Utah Code Ann. § 55-8b-1, et seq.

The plaintiffs

also seek monetary relief against all defendants for violation of
civil rights, and declaration of their rights under the ICWA, the
United States Constitution and state lav/.
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted in 1978 to
remedy perceived inequities in adoption standards for Indian
children.

The Act represents congressional recognition of the

interest of Indian Tribes in the preservation of their valuable
heritage.

Background and cultural differences between society

generally and the Indian nations had greatly influenced social
and adoptive agencies to increase the numbers of Indian children
being placed in foster and adoptive homes.

A general

misunderstanding of Indian culture compounded the numbers of
Indian children being separated from their families.

In 1978,

after recognizing that greater than one-fourth of all Indian
children were separated from their families and placed in foster
homes, adoptive homes or institutions, Congress declared that
"[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children from their
families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of
American Indian life today."

K. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess., 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7530,
7531.

Therefore, in 1978, Congress enacted ICWA, the purpose of

which was
to protect the best interest of Indian
children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by
establishing minimum Federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families
and the placement of such children in foster
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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or adoptive homes or institutions which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture
and by providing for assistance to Indian
tribes and organizations in the operation of
child and family service programs.
Id. at 1.

This Court is aware of and shares that concern.

As

one court stated:
Each individual is an amalgam of the
predominant religious, linguistic, ancestral
and educational influences existent in his or
her surroundings. Indian people, whether
residing on a reservation or not, are immersed
in an environment which is in most respects
antithetical to their traditions.
Furthermore, the cultural diversity among
Indian tribes is unquestionably profound yet
often not fully appreciated in our society
• . . •

Preservation of Indian culture is undoubtedly
threatened and thereby thwarted as the size of
any tribal community dwindles. In addition to
its artifacts, language and history, the
members of a tribe are its culture. Absent
the next generation, any culture is lost and
necessarily relegated, at best, to
anthropological examination and
categorization.
Matter of M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981).

This Court

is cognizant of the responsibility to promote and protect the
unique Indian cultures of this and other states.

This Court als

is aware, however, that the ICWA and principles of equity requir
that the interests of the individual also must be protected, not
in derogation of the Act but in compliance with its specific
provisions.
In order to further Congress1 desire to promote the
welfare of Indian children, families and culture, the ICWA lays
jurisdiction over Indian child adoption proceedings in the tribe
or the state respectively, depending on the domicile of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

child.

The Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over any

child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or
is domiciled within the reservation.

25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1982).

A state court has jurisdiction over foster care placement or
termination of parental rights of Indian children not domiciled
or residing within the reservation, but the Act requires the
state court to transfer the proceeding to the tribe upon petition
of either parent, the custodian or the child's tribe, absent good
cause to the contrary or objection of either parent.
1911(b).

Ld.

§

The Act also requires that the United States, every

state and territory and every Indian tribe

f,

give full faith and

credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
Indian tribes applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to
the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other
entity."

Id. § 1911(d).
The Act necessarily contemplates the state court's

involvement in Indian child adoption proceedings.

Indeed, the

ICWA grants concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts
over adoption proceedings brought under its provisions.
U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1921 (1982); 28 U.S.C. 1360(a) (1982).

25
"Where

the Act applies, the state court has a duty to exercise its
jurisdiction over actions brought thereunder, since to decline
jurisdiction in such a case would violate the supremacy clause of
the federal [Constitution."

E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210, 1215

n.13 (Alaska 1981) [citing Testa v. Katz, 330 U.S. 386 (1947);
Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co,, 223 U.S. 1
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(1911)].

A state court therefore has a right and a need to

determine its own jurisdiction in Indian child adoption cases
brought before it, and a judge making such a determination
clearly would be acting within the scope of his judicial
capacity, regardless of the propriety of his ruling on the
jurisdictional question.
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN CHILD ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction in such proceedings is based upon a
determination of the domicile of the child.

That question was

squarely before the state District Court, which took cognizance
of the issue and made its determination after fully hearing
evidence and arguments of the parties.

That Court found that the

childfs domicile was in Utah with the adoptive parents, and that
transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court would not be in
the best interests of the child.

Those findings are currently on

appeal before the Utah Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to render a declaration of
their rights under the ICWA and the United States Constitution,
contending that these are additional issues not raised in the
state court proceedings.

But those claims presented here as

alleged constitutional and statutory infringements will live or
die on a determination of the issue of domicile, an

issue that

was fully presented and litigated in the state proceeding which
is now pending before the Utah Supreme Court.

Reversal on the

domicile issue in state court basically would give the plaintiffs
the declaratory relief they seek in this Court.

On the other

hand, affirmance would open the avenue of redress before the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Supreme Court of the United States on the constitutional issues.
It would be premature and inappropriate for this Court to enter
rulings of any kind in the present posture of this litigation.
CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
Because the issue of domicile was fully litigated in
the state court proceeding, and now the question of the propriety
of the State Court's application of law and determination of
domicile is pending before the state's highest court, this Court
exercised its discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act by
dismissing plaintiffs1 claim for declaratory relief.

It is

appropriate for federal courts to deny a declaratory judgment
under 28 U.S.C., Section 2201 where the issues raised are likely
to be fully adjudicated in an action pending in state court at
the time the declaratory judgment action is filed in federal
court.

Moore's Federal Practice 51 0.220, at 2387-88 (1985)

[citing Miller v. Miller, .423 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1970).]

The

United States Supreme Court has recognized and upheld exercise of
discretion by district courts in such circumstances, ruling that
a district court is under no compulsion to exercise jurisdiction,
and recognizing that:
The decision in such circumstances is
largely committed to the discretion of the
District Court. . ; . (and) . . . that such
deference may be equally appropriate even when
matters of substantive federal law are
involved in the case. (Footnote omitted.)
Will, U.S. District Judge v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S.
655 (1978) cited in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601
F.2d 1116, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 1979).

See also, State Farm Mut.
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Auto Ins, Co, v, Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1971),
and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona/ 103 S. Ct.
3201 (1983), wherein the Court affirmed district court orders
granting motions to dismiss federal actions seeking adjudication
of water rights, where concurrent state court actions had
previously been initiated.

The issue of domicile and

whether

it was appropriate for the state court to assume jurisdiction
over the adoption proceedings in this case is precisely the
question presented before the Utah Supreme Court.

This Court

does not sit as an appellate court for state decisions, and
declaratory judgment should not be used to re-examine what has
been adjudicated in another forum.

1A J. Moore, W. Taggart & J.

Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 51 0.220, at 2388 n.7 (1985).
See American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. United Founders Life Ins.
Co., 515 F. Supp. 800, (W.D. Okl. 1980), and cases cited therein.
All parties had full and complete opportunity to be
heard in the state court proceedings.

It would not be in the

interests of judicial economy, federal-state comity or the
avoidance of piecemeal and duplicative litigation for this Court
to act upon plaintiffs1 claims for declaratory relief or the
Section 1983 claims.
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
The United States Supreme Court has held that rules of
res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to Section
1983 actions, where a final judgment on the merits of an action
has been rendered in state court and the same issues that were or
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could have been raised in that action are later sought to be
raised in a federal action.
(1980).

Allen v, McCurry, 449 U.S. 90

The Court stated in the Allen case:
The federal courts have traditionally adhered
to the related doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Under res judicata, a
final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating issues that were or could have
been raised in that action. . . . Under
collateral estoppel, once a court has decided
an issue of fact or law necessary to its
judgment, that decision may preclude
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a
different cause of action involving a party to
the first case. . . .
As this Court and other
courts have often recognized, res judicata and
collateral estoppel relieve parties of the
cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conserve judicial resources and, by preventing
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication.

Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
To allow relitigation of the question of the child's
domicile, and ultimately the appropriateness of the state court's
taking jurisdiction of the case for purposes of the Section 1983
claims now asserted, would be to deny the state court system the
full faith and credit to which it is entitled, and would violate
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

In the

recent case of Migra v. Warren City School District Board of
Education, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984), the Supreme Court stated:
It is now settled that a federal court must
give to a state-court judgment the same
preclusive effect as would be given that
judgment under the law of the state in which
the judgment was rendered.
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Id, at 61.

Utah follows the general principles of res judicata

and collateral estoppel as discussed above.

See Penrod v. Nu

Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); Bernard v.
Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981).

This Court finds that the

basis for the plaintiffs1 claims for violation of civil rights
under Section 1983 was fully litigated on the merits in the state
proceeding and this Court is bound by the State Court's decision.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT:

DECISION OF THE

DISTRICT COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION
As observed above, the decision of the District Court
of Utah is entitled to full faith and credit.

But plaintiffs ask

this Court to find that the decision of the District Court of the
Navajo Nation for Window Rock that the Navajo Tribe had exclusive
jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and that Jeremiah was
domiciled on the reservation was entitled to full faith and
credit by the State District Court.

The determination by the

District Court of the Navajo Nation was made some four and onehalf years after the Consent of Adoption was given by the child's
mother in open court in the District Court of Utah, and after
extensive evidence was presented on the domicile issue following
a substantial period of total inaction and inattention to the
matter by the plaintiff Navajo Nation.
There is no question that the ICWA requires universal
recognition of the acts, records and judicial proceedings of any
Indian Tribe.

The Act states:

The United States, every State, every
territory or possession of the United States,
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith
and credit to the public acts, records, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe
applicable to Indian child custody proceedings
to the same extent that such entities give
full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of any other
entity.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).

This statute does not require, however,

that the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any
Indian tribe be accorded greater weight than the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of a state.

Indeed, an Indian

tribe is bound to give full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of a state.

Where the state

court acts within the scope of its judicial capacity to determine
personal jurisdiction and that issue is fully litigated, the
State court clearly would not be required to relinquish
jurisdiction based upon the court order of a sister state over a
year later.

The same is true of the subsequent Tribal Court

Order.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Although we need not reach the question of judicial
immunity, this Court finds it appropriate to address this point
as an additional basis for dismissal of the claims against
defendant Judge David Sam.

This Court holds that Judge Sam is

absolutely immune from any claim for damages, and that injunctive
and declaratory relief against him would serve no purpose.
A.

Claims for Monetary Relief
It is a firmly established principle in our

judicial system that judges are immune from liability for acts
committed within their judicial capacity.

The reason for this

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

judicial immunity, as outlined in Bradley v. Fisher, is that
judges must be free to act upon their own convictions, without
concern of personal consequences to themselves.
(1871).

13 Wall. 335

Although judicial immunity is not without limitations,

"a judge is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in
clear absence of all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial
one.

An act is judicial if it is a function normally performed

by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity . . .

A judge is entitled to immunity even if he acted

with partiality, maliciously, or corruptly."

Martinez v. Winner,

No. 82-2110, slip op. at 8 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1935) [citing
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher,
13 Wall. 335, 348 (1871)].

Although there is danger that some

wrongs may go unredressed as a result of the application of
judicial immunity, our system of justice has found it more
tolerable for a few wrongs to go unredressed than for the courts
to be constantly harassed by suits brought by disappointed
litigants.

Id. slip op. at 12.

The questions presented before

this Court are whether the alleged wrongful conduct of Judge
David Sam occurred outside of Judge Sam's judicial capacity or
function and whether Judge Sam acted in clear absence of all
jurisdiction.

It is clear from the facts that at all times for

which wrongful conduct is alleged Judge Sam was acting in his
judicial capacity and that all his acts were judicial ones.
Additionally, as has been thoroughly discussed, the ICWA
contemplates state courts making determinations of personal
jurisdiction in Indian child adoption proceedings and taking
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jurisdiction in appropriate cases.

The state court's

jurisdiction under the Act to determine its own jurisdiction
constituted judicial action on the part of Judge Sam.
Determination of the issues as to domicile and personal
jurisdiction certainly was not in clear absence of all
jurisdiction, and at the very least constituted a colorable claim
of jurisdiction.

Therefore, this Court rules that as to the

claims for monetary relief, defendant Judge Sam is absolutely
immune.
b.

Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
Although the United States Supreme Court recently

found that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective
injunctive relief against a judicial officer, nor to the award of
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in cases where prospective
injunctive relief is granted, Pulliam v. Allen*, 104 S. Ct. 1970
(1984), the question presented here is whether this case is
appropriate for collateral prospective relief.

Unlike the

respondents in Pulliam, who sought to enjoin a state Magistrate
from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense, the plaintiffs
in his case do not seek the prospective enjoining of an ongoing
unconstitutional practice, but rather seek to reverse a final
judgment which resulted from evidentiary hearings in a specific
case.

The plaintiffs1 request is more in the nature of appellate

review of the State Court decision.

Therefore, this Court finds

that the narrow exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity as
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articulated in the Pulliam decision does not apply to the facts
of this case, and the claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief against defendant David Sam are dismissed.
One additional question that is implicit in the
plaintiffs1 arguments is whether Section 1983 somehow overcomes
the common law doctrine of judicial immunity.

That point was

thoroughly addressed in the recent case of Martinez v. Winner,
548 F. Supp. 278 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd. No. 82.2110 (10th Cir.
Aug. 22, 1984).

That case involved alleged intentionally

wrongful and conspiratorial violations of the Civil Rights Act by
a judge.

Martinez asked the Court to find an exception in such

conduct to the common law doctrine of judicial immunity.
Judge Jenkins of the District Court for Utah

Chief

in the initial

decision in Martinez pointed out that in Pierson [v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967], the United States Supreme Court held that the
common-law doctrine of judicial immunity was not abridged by the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as codified in 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and that "State judges are thus immune from suit
under § 1983 for their 'judicial1 acts.11

548 F. Supp at 292.

This Court finds no basis in law or in fact for
plaintiffs1 claims against defendant David Sam for monetary or
prospective injunctive relief.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants1 Motions for
Summary Judgment are granted, and plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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HoDATED:

September ^Q

, 1985.
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J./THOMAS GREENE
UNI/TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:

Mary Ellen Sloan
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David L. Wilkinson
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